



Connecting the dots: Exploring working-class attitudes to impending gentrification, the case of Västerås, Sweden

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ABSTRACT

Flipping the gentrification coin, we illuminate revitalization from below to explore how residents in a mid-sized Swedish city's working-class neighbourhoods visualize its potential outcomes. We aim to address residents' perceptions of the extent to which a proposed housing development would trigger gentrification pressure and, in this light, whether they are willing to endorse this development or not, and why. To achieve this, we need to know (1) the proportion of residents that are either positive or negative to the proposal of gentrification, and (2) how they explain their stance. The analysis draws on survey data gathered from three working-class neighbourhoods in the city of Västerås, Sweden. We find that class-conscious young residents share a negative attitude to gentrification because they are, *inter alia*, aware of an abundance of vacant, expensive apartments elsewhere in the city. We also find that this is particularly the case among the traditional working-class. Since these concerns often fall on deaf ears, the promises intrinsic to revitalization are sometimes empty. Subsequently, old criticisms resurface concerning how democratic Swedish housing policy is. We suggest, therefore, that municipal housing companies ought to become more sensitive to the fears and hopes of the city's working-class inhabitants.

1. Introduction

Once upon a time, housing policy was an integral part of the welfare state's politics (Elander et al., 1991; Grundström & Molina, 2016). This has changed. Today, housing is dictated by what the critical research stream refers to as a neoliberal elitist policy (Atkinson, 2004; Lees, 2008). To give substance to this claim, we begin by describing changes in Sweden's housing policy background. Second, we present some of the main challenges on this front. Indeed, best described by the formula: regulation-deregulation-marketization (Grundström & Molina, 2016), Swedish housing policy has its origins in the Folkhem (the People's home). In the early years of this egalitarian project (1930s to the 1960s), Sweden saw “an exponential increase in the amount of high-quality housing” (Grundström & Molina, 2016, p. 317). This had mainly to do with the fact that Swedish housing policy was organized by municipal housing companies that were governed by the principle of “housing for all” (Thörn & Polanska, 2023). Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, Sweden was characterized by the highest housing production per capita

in the world. However, a paradigmatic shift towards marketisation occurred in the beginning of the 1990s, which now has a significant influence over housing in Sweden (Grundström & Molina, 2016).

The privatization of housing policy in Sweden creates a plethora of new challenges for municipal housing companies that are currently underway. For instance, the role of the municipal housing company, where its main goal is to guarantee housing for all households (Bengtsson & Grander, 2023), is now based on business principles (Butler & Robson, 2003; Thörn & Polanska, 2023). Therefore, even though 42% of all rental apartments are still owned by municipal housing companies (Sveriges allmännyttan, 2025), there has been a general tendency towards the exclusion of low-income households. This has not gone unnoticed. There is now pushback from political parties, NGOs, and tenancy associations, particularly with regards to steep requirements on income in order to gain access to a rental apartment (Grander & Sjöland Kozlovic, 2025).

Other more general challenges facing Swedish housing policy today, such as the housing shortage and a corresponding increase in, *inter alia*,

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crowding, residential segregation, and gentrification, also have to do with the privatization of housing and the new role of municipal housing companies. To begin with, 72% of Sweden's municipalities are currently experiencing a housing shortage. Secondly, crowding has tripled over the last 25 years (Bengtsson & Grander, 2023, p. 14). Thirdly, to mitigate residential segregation, four out of ten poor households in Sweden would need to move to more upscale neighbourhoods (Bengtsson & Grander, 2023, p. 15). However, the Swedish middle-class is unwilling to give its consent to this kind of social mixing (Fell & Widell, 2024). Therefore, “[w]hile privileged groups in the 2010s can choose between various forms of concept and luxury housing, the rental housing shortage has reached crisis levels, and locks, fences, and gates now restrict access to spaces that were previously publicly accessible” (Grundström & Molina, 2016, p. 331).

This market-oriented ideology now permeates urban planning worldwide and is, without exception, one of the main drivers behind gentrification (Lees, 2008). Two manifestations of this policy shift are visible in the European context and concern, firstly, the amendment of old and drafting of new EU housing-related directives, as well as, secondly, the (unopposed) harmonization of relevant member-states' legislation (Uitermark et al., 2023). This is important to note since gentrification is flourishing in Europe (Cassiers & Kesteloot, 2012) and, hence, is still reshaping the spatial and social dynamics of its cities (Paton, 2009; Thörn & Holgersson, 2016). A typical example of this outcome can be found in Stockholm's inner-city neighbourhoods, which experienced moderate gentrification in the mid-1990s (Andersson & Turner, 2014).

Furthermore, gentrification sped up again after 2010 when old Swedish housing legislation (the *Allbolagen*) was amended to meet the requirements of new EU housing policy (Svensk författningssamling, 2010:879). Consequently, legal harmonization and privatization is dismantling the public housing sectors of European countries like Sweden (Listerborn et al., 2020). This veritable shift in the housing policy paradigm is, irrespective of a city's size and location (Ellis-Young & Doucet, 2021), evident in increasing rents and a more pervasive and exclusive ownership-based tenurial system (Adamiak & Marjavaara, 2023; Bengtsson & Kopsch, 2019). Because of this, it is important to illuminate perceptions of gentrification from below, by which we imply the application of a bottom-up perspective to investigate how residents in one of Sweden's most common city types, working-class neighbourhoods, visualize its possible outcomes. Our definition of working-class includes both the annual mean income of labour in a neighbourhood (Table 1), and the level of education that most of its residents have attained (Table A2).

Our underlying thesis is that initiatives resulting from any given city's plans to revitalize working-class neighbourhoods cannot completely meet the housing preferences of their more vulnerable communities. Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, gentrification has been known to displace working-class residents and guarantee the future exclusion of the same class from burgeoning middle-class

Table 1

Classification framework: Describing each neighbourhood context in 2020 (%). Source: Statistics Sweden.

	Neighbourhood's working-class (WC) position			
	Jakobsberg (Affluent WC)	Hammarby (Traditional WC)	Pettersberg (Emergent WC)	Average (Entire WC)
Mean neighbourhood disp. Income SEK	344,552	230,534	201,588	258,894
Population	1627	2630	3600	2619
Swedish-born (of total population)	1425 (88)	1450 (55)	1648 (46)	1520 (58)
Households	728	1106	1583	1139
Number of residents per household	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.3

neighbourhoods (Fell & Widell, 2024; Lees, 2008). Painting an even clearer picture, if some of the original residents remain, they and the gentrifiers will likely avoid each other (Bosch & Ouwehand, 2019; van Gent et al., 2016). With this in mind, and because communities are usually unable to influence plans for revitalization (Thurber et al., 2019), we also investigate how aware at-risk-of-being-gentrified working-class residents are of the well-documented negative neighbourhood effects associated with this process of segregation (Lees & Ferreri, 2016).

Inevitably, scholars define gentrification as a coercive and unjust process that spawns negative city-wide effects (Atkinson, 2004; Kofman & Lebas, 1996; Lees, 2008). On the other hand, the fact that gentrification is scrupulously marketed under the banner of a revitalization that promises “increased liveability for all” goes a long way towards explaining why ethnographies and surveys of gentrification in cities such as Edinburgh (Doucet, 2009), Glasgow (Paton, 2009), and Washington DC (Owens et al., 2023) report a high degree of consent among communities that reside in targeted working-class neighbourhoods. Accepting this academic ambiguity, we strive to unpack the complex content of competing justifications expressed by those who either view the *proposal* of gentrification as positive or negative.

Since we address attitudes to gentrification before it occurs, we need to rethink and avoid the terminology typically used to describe ongoing or completed gentrification processes. For instance, the dichotomy of middle-class “winners” and working-class “losers” generally applied to explain the outcomes of gentrification in, for instance, Scottish cities (see Doucet, 2009; Paton, 2009) is not applicable to our study. That is, since we step back to focus on working-class residents' attitudes to a fictive (but likely) revitalization process (the initial stage of gentrification), there can be no winners or losers. This is because the intervention has not happened yet. Thus, using this and similar dichotomies would supersede the logic of events and frame its outcomes. Instead, we opt to focus on different themes intrinsic to the literature on gentrification (Draper, 2024; Lees, 2008; Sullivan, 2007). In this way, we draw on the accrued knowledge about this now ubiquitous urban practice and track back along the timeline of the process to investigate anew attitudes to gentrification.

Accordingly, our aim is to provide hands-on evidence about gentrification pressure by exploring working-class residents' attitudes to this kind of housing development. That is, we investigate residents' perceptions of the extent to which a proposed development would trigger gentrification pressures and, in this light, whether they are willing to endorse this development or not, and why. To this end, we construct our research in a manner that takes the debate into consideration by asking questions to explore the reasons why the new housing policy intervention schemes in Sweden are considered by residents as carrying the risk of gentrification. In a manuscript that explores perceptions, we choose to ask research questions that allow nuances to surface and more accurately capture residents' voices. We ask: How many residents are either positive or negative to this kind of revitalization? How do they explain their stance? Put simply, do they know what is coming and, if not, can a lack of awareness explain the ease with which gentrification transforms urban settings in a democratic society?

To this end, we first consider theories of gentrification in seminal literature on gentrification to unearth and explore attitudes to gentrification that may inform the debate. Second, we describe our case, which is the mid-sized Swedish city of Västerås. Third, as part of our method, we present our survey, sample and statistical model. Fourth, in our research outcomes and analysis, we highlight how perceptions interact to form residents' views on impending gentrification. Finally, from our conclusions, we create a timeline of gentrification to discuss if, and how, this city-planning process is sensitive to the fears and hopes of the city's working-class inhabitants.

2. Literature review

Before reviewing the body of work on gentrification, it is important

to note that we are using literature from the debate to inform the coming analysis. Our case study is a heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for which evidence is being collected. In this case, we use the replies to open-ended questions to shed light on issues intrinsic to gentrification. For instance, we need to know why residents tend to take on any views of gentrification prior to the development occurring. Moreover, we cannot assume that residents have read about such studies. Therefore, we need to pay attention to how previous examples of similar (re)developments shape residents' perceptions as expressed in their statements.

The concept of gentrification is just as applicable to the mid-sized city neighbourhood context, our analytical focus, as it is to neighbourhood contexts in large metropolitan areas (Ellis-Young & Doucet, 2021). Interpreted as such, we begin our journey by unearthing the reasons why gentrification is occasionally viewed in either a positive or negative manner. Research from the 1960s and 1970s suggests gentrification has a positive effect, that is, creates "more liveable and sustainable communities" (Lees, 2008, p. 2449), and that this argument was used to influence pro-gentrification policy. Other research (see Draper, 2024; Freeman & Braconi, 2004; Wrigley, 2002) finds that gentrification engenders a benign coexistence between the remaining working-class residents and new middle-class residents. One common explanation for this belief in benign coexistence is that "the new stores that open as a result of gentrification can come to be appreciated by lower-income residents" (Doucet, 2009, p. 302). Moving on, homeowners living in working-class neighbourhoods are more likely than renters to approve of gentrification (Sullivan, 2007). This segment of residents believes that when "house values rise, public and private investment increases, the retail sector grows, and municipal services such as police protection and street maintenance improve" (Sullivan, 2007, p. 583).

Contesting positive attitudes to gentrification and building on previous research (Cassiers & Kesteloot, 2012; Lees, 2008; Tuttle, 2022), negative attitudes to gentrification are based on the notion that increased social discord and/or place-based alienation among residents in targeted neighbourhoods will reduce the liveability of their community (Atkinson, 2004). This is most aptly explained by the phenomenon of disaffiliation (van Gent et al., 2016), which describes a situation where there is a noticeable lack of social interaction between the remnant working-class and new middle-class residents. This is summed up in the following quote: "[t]here is little evidence of numbers of cross class friendship" in gentrified neighbourhoods (Lees, 2008, p. 2458). This absence of a benign coexistence is particularly conspicuous in a gentrified neighbourhood's public places (Atkinson, 2003). Moreover, original working-class residents are not always the prime beneficiaries of the "boom and development" associated with gentrification (Paton, 2009). Adding to this negative perception of gentrification, we already know that "... new services, shops and amenities are built for a newer, high-income clientele who is moving into the neighbourhood" (Doucet, 2009, p. 302). This form of exclusion may even exacerbate the situation for the original working-class remnant since housing will become less affordable (Baeten et al., 2017). This is particularly the case concerning "poor and longtime renters that fear eviction and displacement more than homeowners do" (Sullivan, 2007, p. 583). Thus, we assert that the fear of eviction and displacement may sow discord among working-class renters, leading them to become more unwilling to endorse this kind of development. Thus, this brief literature review reveals that working-class residents' attitudes to impending gentrification in neighbourhoods in the city of Västerås are dependent on a multitude of factors.

3. The case of Västerås, Sweden

Our aim is not to discover objective and replicable "truths". Instead, we explore working-class attitudes to the prospect of gentrification from a narrow single case carried out in multiple neighbourhoods (Table 1). This analytical strategy enables us to explore attitudes to impending gentrification in different types of neighbourhoods (Hamnett, 2015;

Savage et al., 2013). Using the same logic, we also select neighbourhoods from one of Sweden's most common city types: the mid-sized city (Bergsten & Holmqvist, 2013). Any findings pertaining to gentrification unearthed in our study will be duly registered with the intent of informing the debate.

Every Swedish municipality is named after its largest city, which is a central housing policy actor. This is evidenced by its planning monopoly and, above all else, the fact that it carries the responsibility for ensuring "good housing for all" (Bengtsson & Grander, 2023). One such municipality, Västerås, is located circa 100 km due west of the Swedish capital: Stockholm. Its population has increased by 25,000 inhabitants over the last 15 years, and it now stands at 160,000 (Statistics Sweden, 2023a). In its revised program for housing availability (DNR: 2020/00343, p. 7), it is apparent that, despite an increase in new build projects in its neighbourhoods, Västerås is still facing a general housing shortage. To counteract this negative trend, the city has formulated four housing policy goals: (1) housing for all, (2) housing for more, (3) housing in the right place, and (4) housing the right way. Based on these goals, the city believes it can create the conditions for people living in the current housing stock to move to newly constructed homes and increase their mobility. That is, make homes more available for those waiting in the housing queue. These goals also imply that the city needs more knowledge about the character of the housing demand. One way of tackling this lack of knowledge is for the city to increase its cooperation with private housing companies. Another implication of these goals is that the city needs to build housing in otherwise accessible but abandoned neighbourhood spaces (Västerås, 2023: DNR: 2020/00343, pp. 7–9).

The city's housing policy has several implications for our study. First, city-planners are faced with the challenge of constructing new homes to meet a growing demand for housing. Second, given the current trend in Swedish urban development (Bengtsson & Kopsch, 2019; Thörn & Holgersson, 2016), gentrification as well as the subsequent sharpening of spatial segregation (Andersson & Turner, 2014), is both likely and may even reconstitute the demographic composition of the city's neighbourhoods (Owens et al., 2023). It is worth mentioning, therefore, that even if residents believe that gentrification is an inevitable consequence of revitalization there is still a possibility that they may resist it. Third, from the debate, we know that relatively high-income homeowners and low-income renters are expected to perceive gentrification differently. Therefore, we heed Owens et al.'s (2023, p. 1576) call for "a more rigorous class analysis related to perceptions of gentrification." Accordingly, we focus on three of the city's 76 neighbourhoods (Statistics Sweden, 2023b; Fig. 1). These are: Jakobsberg, Hammarby, and Pettersberg (Table 1). Noteworthy is that each of these neighbourhoods has its own specific working-class position (Hamnett, 2015; Savage et al., 2013). That is, a majority of each neighbourhood's residents have either a medium (affluent), medium-to-low (traditional), or low (emergent) income (Table 1). Moreover, they have in common that they are located in the city's stigmatized western district (Fell & Widell, 2024; Wacquant, 2008; Fig. 1). Furthermore, they have either recently been revitalized or are currently undergoing plans for varying degrees of revitalization.

In accordance with the Swedish plans and building code (Svensk författningssamling, 2025:519, §§ 12–13), every municipality (in consultation with the County Administrative Board) must have a comprehensive plan (including detail plans) for the construction of new buildings or neighbourhoods that is open for discussion and evaluation under a two-month period prior to the commencement of the particular project. The project is traditionally announced on a bulletin board located at the concerned municipality's city hall and on its homepage. However, nowadays each comprehensive plan is published in the municipality's most-read local newspapers and may even be followed up by articles where journalists interview either politicians, civil servants, and/or concerned residents. This, in turn, often leads to letters to concerned civil servants or editors where people express their views about the planned project. In some cases, local associations can appeal the



Fig. 1. Map of Västerås city's urban landscape with three neighbourhoods' different working-class positions highlighted (source: www.vasteras.se).

comprehensive plans to the County Administrative Board. As we will show concerning the Hammarby neighbourhood, residents can sometimes even establish a new association so that they can appeal plans for the development of their neighbourhood (Gergis, 2021).

The Jakobsberg neighbourhood is located in proximity to the city centre (see black dotted line in Fig. 1). It has a relatively small population and, with its mostly Swedish-born residents, is ethnically homogenous (Table 1). We categorize this kind of working-class neighbourhood as *affluent* since its residents have a moderately good economic capital (Hamnett, 2015; Savage et al., 2013; Table 1). However, this categorization is debatable since 45% of the neighbourhood's residents have attended university (Table A2). Thus, a large minority of its residents can be defined as belonging to the middle-class. Considering that Jakobsberg is a “neighbourhood that rarely ever changes” (Brown-Saracino, 2009), goes a long way towards explaining the scarcity of detailed plans (dp) for the construction of new homes there. Although the city has, as early as 2011 (Västerås, 2011b: dp1766), enabled the neighbourhood's homeowners to build ancillary homes on their property, a gentrification process is unlikely, but not impossible. There are currently no plans to construct buildings that facilitate retail or amenities. Nonetheless, its residents' stance on gentrification is important to investigate since it, too, has a working-class position, albeit a more affluent one.

The Hammarby neighbourhood is located southwest of the Jakobsberg and Pettersberg neighbourhoods (see blue dotted line in Fig. 1). Its residents have a moderately poor economic capital, are ethnically mixed, and live in relatively crowded households (Table 1). It can, therefore, be designated as a neighbourhood with *traditional* working-class residents (Hamnett, 2015; Savage et al., 2013). Noteworthy is that its residents have in 2019 mobilized to establish a grassroots association (the Hammarby Neighbourhood Association) to actively resist plans (Västerås, 2011a: dp1733) for the construction of new housing. Fearing the loss of green areas and open spaces (Gergis, 2021), the association was given a mandate by its residents to put an end to the city's plans to densify the neighbourhood by building 500 new homes between existing buildings (Västerås, 2011a: dp1733). This resistance to gentrification eventually prompted politicians to deliberate with residents concerning current plans to revitalize the neighbourhood, that is, construct buildings that even cater for retail and amenities (Västerås, 2020a: Dnr BN 2023/00235–3.1.4; Gergis, 2021).

Located between the E18 Stockholm-Oslo highway and the Jakobsberg neighbourhood (see red dotted line in Fig. 1), the Pettersberg neighbourhood is characterized by high-rise buildings and a relatively

large population. Most of its residents are born outside of Sweden and have a moderately poor economic capital (Table 1). For these reasons, we categorize Pettersberg as a neighbourhood with *emergent* working-class residents (Hamnett, 2015; Savage et al., 2013). Of interest is that the city plans to build new housing in the form of three high-rise towers as well as terraced houses in different parts of the Pettersberg neighbourhood that together will provide 218 new homes for its growing population (Västerås, 2008: dp1659; Västerås, 2020b: dp1874). This construction will not facilitate retail or amenities. As a result, and since only the middle-class can possibly afford to rent or purchase these new homes (Listerborn et al., 2020), this small, and compact, neighbourhood faces certain gentrification.

4. Methodological approach

4.1. Survey design and sample

Concerning the survey's design, it is made up of 16 questions whereof five aim to provide insights concerning respondents' demographic character (Q1-Q5), five address their housing situation (Q6-Q10), two address their physical and social neighbourhood context (Q11 and Q12), one concerns their perceptions of other similar and dissimilar neighbourhoods (Q13) and three concern gentrification (Q14) and respondents' stance (Q15 and Q16) on gentrification (Table A1). Eight of these questions (Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, Q8, Q9, and Q10) are structured and provide multiple choice options. Three questions (Q11, Q12, and Q13) are ranked using Likert scales. Finally, the survey includes five open-ended questions (Q2, Q7, Q14, Q15, and Q16), where Q14 is the main question (Table A1).

Made available via a QR-coded postcard, an online survey was conducted in Swedish and carried out in the city of Västerås during the COVID pandemic in 2020. The postcards were sent to a total of 3417 households in the Jakobsberg, Hammarby and Pettersberg neighbourhoods. The QR code allowed residents to instantly gain access to a Google Forms survey and participate via their smartphones (Dillman et al., 2014). Amounting 17%, a total of 594 residents (who are representatives of each of the targeted households) opted to respond to the survey (Table A2). Despite having the largest population among the three neighbourhoods, the response rate is the lowest in the Pettersberg neighbourhood (11%) and can be explained by its very low proportion of Swedish-born residents (Table 1). Nevertheless, the proportion of Swedish-born residents is also low in the Hammarby neighbourhood (Table 1), where the response rate (25%) is more than twice as high

(Table A2). This could be due to its history of resistance to city-planning (Gergis, 2021). All told, a response rate of 20% is considered acceptable for online surveys (Nulty, 2009; Wu et al., 2022).

In essence, the survey is designed to (1) explore respondents' attitudes to the prospect of gentrification, (2) identify the characteristics of those who are either positive or negative to the proposal (see Owens et al., 2023 for a similar approach), and (3) elicit the explanations underlying each group's stance. Respondents' attitude to gentrification is operationalized herein by the question: What is your attitude to plans to construct buildings with expensive rental apartments and condominiums in your neighbourhood? The wording of our main question may have some unforeseen implications. That is, by using "expensive homes" as the marker of gentrification, we are aware that this could prime people to think about housing and, thus, appear to exclude retail and amenities. However, this omission is not detrimental to the study since previous research shows that residents are aware that more expensive housing will eventually attract new stores and amenities (Doucet, 2009).

We are aware that residents' personal experience and previous and current housing circumstances may determine their emotional response to this question (Krumpal, 2011). For this reason, the question was placed at the end of the questionnaire to minimize non-responses (Dillman et al., 2014; Table A1). We interpret a positive response to our question as openness to gentrification and, subsequently, that members of working-class neighbourhoods are willing to accept those middle-class residents who will eventually reside there. Therefore, there is an obvious (but not absolute) connection between attitudes to "expensive apartments and condominiums" and attitudes to "gentrification". We converted responses positive (1) and negative (0) into one dependent variable.

Despite a somewhat uneven distribution of gender, where males from traditional and affluent working-class neighbourhoods are slightly underrepresented, the sample is still representative. That is, the biggest difference (four percentage points) between both genders is negligible (Table A2). The difference in average age between the resident population and the respondent sample in all three neighbourhoods is also insignificant (Table A2). Even the level of educational attainment in our sample corresponds roughly with the percentages of residents with a completed university education in all three neighbourhoods (Table A2). Furthermore, the mean for Swedish-born respondents in our survey corresponds almost exactly with the actual proportion of Swedish-born residents in the Jakobsberg neighbourhood (Table A2). Nevertheless, because of the need for acclimatization and the prevalence of the language barrier, there is an expected underrepresentation of foreign born residents in our survey. This is particularly the case in the ethnically heterogeneous Pettersberg neighbourhood. Finally, the housing types that resident populations, and the respondent sample, dwell in are comparable (Table A2).

4.2. Statistical model and variables

To investigate the relationship between the independent variables and attitudes towards gentrification, we employ a binary logistic regression model. This model is specified as follows:

$$P_{ij} = \frac{e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \dots + \beta_k X_k}}{1 + e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \dots + \beta_k X_k}} \quad (1)$$

where i stands for respondents, j is categories (1 = positive and 0 = negative), k is the number of independent variables, and X_i denotes the vector of independent variables, outlined in eq. (2). The independent variables that set out to test working-class residents' attitudes to impending gentrification are described in the same equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Gentrification} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Gender} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Age} + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Place of birth} \\ & + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Employment} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Residency length} \\ & + \beta_6 \cdot \text{Educational attainment} + \beta_7 \cdot \text{Tenurial system} \\ & + \beta_8 \cdot \text{Level of rent} + \beta_9 \cdot \text{Type of housing} \\ & + \beta_{10} \cdot \text{Residency} + \beta_{11} \cdot \text{Physical context} \\ & + \beta_{12} \cdot \text{Social context} + \beta_{13} \cdot \text{Neighbourhood perception} \\ & + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Based on our literature review, categorization of working-class neighbourhoods and attributes of the individual resident, the following variables will be used in the coming analysis to address our research questions. Attitudes to gentrification are tested by using specific independent variables collected via the survey such as *age* (Q2 in the survey), which is linked with young (−45 years) and older (+45 years) residents' attitudes where the age cut-off is determined both by the mean age of the respondent group (45 years) and the average age of a Swede (41.2 years); *educational attainment* (Q3), which is linked with residents' level of education (primary, secondary, and university); *physical context* (Q11), which is linked with perceptions of attractiveness, infrastructure, public transport and amenities; *social context* (Q12), which is linked with perception of trust, security, community and association (Table A1). Other independent variables include *residency* (Q6), which is either Jakobsberg, Hammarby, or Pettersberg and *residency length* (Q7), which is linked with a resident's time in the neighbourhood; *tenurial system* (Q8) and *type of housing* (Q9), where the former is linked with either ownership or renter status and the latter with either an apartment, row-house, or house; and *level of rent* (Q10), which is divided into four brackets (0–5000 SEK, 5001–7500 SEK, 7501–10,000 SEK, and 10,001–SEK). Since we inductively code open-ended responses to Q14 (Table A1), we use the regression analysis to test their significance concerning impending gentrification.

All told, 88% of the respondents stated why they are positive ($n = 214$) or negative ($n = 307$) to the proposal of gentrification. From this qualitative data, and in accordance with Grodal et al.'s (2021) three-step approach, we first coded respondents' statements based on their stance (positive or negative). Second, we derived some general issues from each theme. Third, we refined these tentative issues by dropping, merging and splitting them. This approach allowed us to stabilize five issues/factors to explain each theme (positive or negative attitudes to gentrification) and exemplify them by using quotes (see Tables 4 and 5).

5. Research outcomes and analysis

Firstly, answering our main question, a small majority of respondents (60%) from all three working-class neighbourhoods are negative to the proposal of gentrification (Table 2). As expected, respondents from the affluent and least likely candidate-for-gentrification neighbourhood of Jakobsberg are more positive than their counterparts in the Pettersberg and Hammarby neighbourhoods. This corroborates previous findings that the highest proportion of residents who are positive to

Table 2
Working-class residents' attitudes towards proposed gentrification (%).

		Respondents' stance		
		Positive	Negative	Total
Neighbourhood	Jakobsberg (affluent working-class)	74 (50)	75 (50)	149 (100)
	Hammarby (traditional working-class)	98 (35)	179 (65)	277 (100)
	Pettersberg (emergent working-class)	64 (38)	104 (62)	168 (100)
	All neighbourhoods (entirety of working-class)	236 (40)	358 (60)	594 (100)

gentrification (50%) tend to be found in the neighbourhood that has the oldest homeowners (Sullivan, 2007; Table 2; Table A2).

Secondly, also giving weight to earlier findings (Doucet, 2009; Owens et al., 2023), resistance to the proposal of gentrification is most pervasive in the Pettersberg and Hammarby neighbourhoods (Table 2). Considering that Hammarby's residents have previously mobilized to resist plans to gentrify their neighbourhood (Gergis, 2021), it is not unexpected that the most negative respondents (65%) can be found there.

5.1. Exploring positive attitudes to proposed gentrification

Neither the importance of new stores nor other amenities (Doucet, 2009; Paton, 2009), which are important elements of what we call the physical context, correlate significantly with residents' attitudes to impending gentrification in working-class neighbourhoods (Table 3). Also noteworthy is that amenities, and trickle-down-based welfare for that matter (Lees, 2008), are not mentioned in the qualitative statements of residents (Table 4).

However, in the impending gentrification context, some of the respondents touch indirectly on both issues (amenities and welfare), which are factors underpinning positive attitudes. That is, with a point of departure in Table 3 and in line with the findings in previous research (Doucet, 2009; Sullivan, 2007), we find that home and condominium owners are still inclined to believe that gentrification will increase the liveability of their communities (Table 3). However, as we will show (Table 4 and Table 5), this is done for different reasons (Wrigley, 2002). Despite a lack of significant correlation between social context and attitudes to impending gentrification (Table 3), we find that there is a belief among some young residents from all working-class neighbourhoods that social mixing is a factor that engenders a positive attitude to gentrification (Table 4). Prior to gentrification, we find that gentrification for residents is more about counteracting the stigmatization of their neighbourhood (see quote R363 below; Table 4) than it is about any expectations concerning the possible benefits of trickle-down welfare (Draper, 2024; Lees, 2008). Moreover, although adding higher-income

Table 3
Determinants of attitudes to gentrification based on logistic regression analysis.

VARIABLES	Estimate	Robust Std. errors	Sig. p-value	Odds Ratios	95% C.I.
Gentrification: (Dependent variable)					
Gender (1 = Male)	0.067	(0.181)	0.711	1.069	(-0.287-0.421)
Age (1 = Old)	-0.789***	(0.228)	0.001	0.454***	(-1.236 - -0.342)
Place of birth (1 = Foreign born)	-0.331	(0.236)	0.160	0.718	(-0.793-0.131)
Employment (1 = Working)	0.152	(0.191)	0.427	1.164	(-0.222-0.526)
Residency length	-0.006	(0.010)	0.522	0.994	(-0.026-0.013)
Educational attainment (1 = Primary ref.)	0.275	(0.368)	0.455	1.316	(-0.446-0.996)
Secondary					
University	0.126	(0.371)	0.735	1.134	(-0.601-0.853)
Tenurial system (1 = Homeownership)	0.720***	(0.271)	0.008	2.054***	(0.188-1.252)
Level of rent (Medium 5001-7500 SEK ref.)	0.099	(0.231)	0.667	1.105	(-0.354-0.553)
Low (0-5000 SEK)					
High (7501-10,000 SEK)	-0.277	(0.264)	0.295	0.758	(-0.795-0.241)
Very high (10,001 - SEK)	0.580	(0.359)	0.106	1.786	(-0.124-1.284)
Type of housing (1 = Apartment ref.)	0.391	(0.369)	0.289	1.479	(-0.331-1.114)
Row-house					
House	0.561*	(0.300)	0.061	1.753*	(-0.026-1.149)
Residency (1 = Jakobsberg ref.)	-0.493**	(0.245)	0.044	0.611**	(-0.972 - -0.013)
Hammarby					
Pettersberg	0.011	(0.269)	0.968	1.011	(-0.518-0.539)
Physical context (1 = Very bad)	-0.010	(0.177)	0.956	0.990	(-0.358-0.338)
Social context (1 = Very bad)	0.160	(0.150)	0.284	1.174	(-0.133-0.454)
Neighbourhood perception (1 = positive)	0.096	(0.307)	0.756	1.100	(-0.506-0.697)
Constant	-1.270	(0.977)	0.193	0.281	(-3.185-0.644)
				No. of obs.	579
				Wald chi2	54.43
				prob > chi2	0.000
				Pseudo R2	0.080

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table 4
Factors underpinning positive attitudes ranked and sorted by neighbourhood (%).

Factors		Neighbourhood			
		Jakobsberg	Hammarby	Pettersberg	All
Factors	Housing mix	10 (15)	20 (23)	19 (32)	49 (23)
	Housing availability	16 (24)	17 (19)	13 (22)	46 (22)
	Decrease stigma	14 (21)	17 (19)	10 (17)	41 (19)
	Social mix	14 (21)	16 (18)	11 (18)	41 (19)
	Property value	12 (18)	18 (20)	7 (12)	37 (17)
Total		66 (100)	88 (100)	60 (100)	214 (100)

Table 5
Factors underpinning negative attitudes ranked and sorted by neighbourhood (%).

Factors		Neighbourhood			
		Jakobsberg	Hammarby	Pettersberg	All
Factors	Class awareness	21 (34)	55 (37)	28 (29)	104 (35)
	Less affordable	9 (15)	34 (23)	34 (35)	77 (25)
	Enough expensive	14 (23)	23 (15)	19 (20)	56 (18)
	Sustain green areas	7 (11)	22 (15)	8 (8)	37 (12)
	Infrastructure	11 (18)	12 (8)	7 (7)	31 (10)
Total		62 (100)	149 (100)	96 (100)	307 (100)

households will undoubtedly lead to more pressure for increased amenities, we still find no mention of this aspect of gentrification in our respondents' statements (Table 4).

From our regression analysis, we find that homeowners are more inclined to have a positive attitude to gentrification than renters are

(Table 3; Sullivan, 2007). However, because of our reversed focus, the factors that emerge in our study also deviate from those unearthed in the literature review since they do not just concern property value but also the housing mix and its availability (Table 4). Given that housing mix and housing availability are top reasons for residents having a positive attitude to gentrification, it is possible that they are unaware that gentrification may lead to increased housing costs and their displacement. In fact, the data indicates that residents instead believe that gentrification will make their neighbourhood more affordable by increasing housing supply. For instance, a young female resident of the Jakobsberg neighbourhood said that:

Because there is a housing shortage, it is good with new possibilities for living. I think that it is good with the possibility to choose different standards depending on what kind of housing one is looking for. Not everybody wants to live the same (R214).

Noteworthy is that this statement is contradicted by researchers such as Elander et al. (1991) as well as Kearns and Mason (2007), who show that mixed tenurial systems rarely engender a social mix, let alone achieve the ideal of benign coexistence. With this ambivalence in mind, and emphasizing the connection between increased housing availability and stigmatization, another young female resident from the Pettersberg neighbourhood holds the belief that:

Homes are needed irrespective of price. More expensive homes can change the reputation of the neighbourhood. There are prejudices that Pettersberg and Hammarby are troublesome neighbourhoods with a lot of crime" (R363).

Another factor that explains a resident's positive attitude to impending gentrification is the belief prevalent among homeowners that their property value will increase (Table 3 and Table 4). This finding aligns perfectly with previous research (Sullivan, 2007). For instance, a male resident from the Pettersberg neighbourhood states that gentrification could lead to his "... neighbourhood increasing in value and becoming more exclusive" (R357). However, we also find that there is even a belief, among respondents from other neighbourhoods, that goes beyond (increased) property value, that it will even lead to more security. This belief is expressed by a male resident of the Jakobsberg neighbourhood. He states simply that "With expensive homes comes security" (R423). This is an interesting finding since it explicitly links different factors underpinning positive attitudes to gentrification to each other and adds new content to the latter.

Hence, our findings show how different factors intertwine in unique ways to underpin attitudes to impending gentrification (Table 5). That is, there is a belief among some working-class residents, particularly older homeowners (Table 4), that a more balanced and available housing mix will increase their property's value and engender a social mix that will increase security and reduce the concerned neighbourhood's stigma (Table 5).

5.2. Exploring negative attitudes to proposed gentrification

There is no significant correlation between social context and attitudes to impending gentrification in our regression analysis (Table 4). Nevertheless, we find that young respondents are more prone to harbour a negative attitude to gentrification than older residents (Table 4). This is often explained by an awareness among young residents that they are not the prime beneficiaries of gentrification (Doucet, 2009). We find that this attitude is predominant in the socially and ethnically mixed Hammarby neighbourhood (Table 3 and Table 4). However, when faced with the prospect of gentrification, the fear of place-based alienation or displacement (Atkinson, 2003; Lees, 2008; van Gent et al., 2016) does not appear to concern respondents prior to gentrification proper (Table 5).

Instead, we find that the prominence of class awareness (Tuttle,

2022), is a finding that revises and widens our current understanding of residents' attitudes prior to gentrification. A statement made by a young female from the Jakobsberg neighbourhood highlights to some degree the universal nature of class awareness. She says:

Not everybody gets the chance to live here, which makes this a class issue. There are so many single people who also need to be included and be given the same chance as everyone else (R10).

Here, we find that class encompasses the issue of justice inasmuch as singles are perceived by younger residents to be discriminated against by the city's housing policy. A young male resident of the Pettersberg neighbourhood captures another aspect of class consciousness when he says that:

Nobody wants to pay too much for living, but some are forced to do so anyway. Because they have no choice and are punished by having to put out half of their income just to have a roof over their heads, in a safer neighbourhood. The landlord doesn't give a shit that the living standard is like from the last century. Sometimes it costs 6000 to 7000 kronor just to live in a big closet that MAYBE has room for a bed and an armchair, shameful. There should be a law that one-room apartments have to be at least 40 square meters and cost no more than 100 kronor per square meter (R127).

Extrapolating on this quote, another young female resident of the same neighbourhood introduces the issue of expensive homes as a separate but implicit underpinning of the affordability issue. She states:

If we only have expensive homes, young people won't be able to afford to live here, and we need to live close to schools and the university. The older residents can drive their cars from their expensive apartments (R88).

This is an expected finding since older residents have employment and have owned their homes for a long time. Hence, they are perceived as better-off. To reiterate, we still find that the alienation and disaffiliation (Atkinson, 2003; van Gent et al., 2016) experienced by the original residents of already gentrified neighbourhoods has not yet been experienced by young residents. Instead, they fear that housing may become more expensive and eventually unaffordable for vulnerable resident groups such as young singles (Table 5). The prevalence of class awareness is also an interesting finding since it too promotes a negative attitude to impending gentrification. Once again, we see how different factors blend to expand our understanding of gentrification (Table 5).

To reiterate, there is no significant correlation between physical context and attitudes to gentrification in our regression analysis (Table 3). Nevertheless, in their statements, we find that negative attitudes arise among residents because they fear that housing in their neighbourhoods may become more expensive (and unaffordable) if it is gentrified. This finding aligns with attitudes elicited from other working-class communities' experience of gentrification (Baeten et al., 2017; Doucet, 2009; Sullivan, 2007). However, our study discovers some subtle differences. For instance, the abundance of expensive apartments elsewhere in the city is mentioned by some residents to be the main reason why they believe that the gentrification of their neighbourhood is unnecessary. A young female resident from the Pettersberg neighbourhood explains why this is:

There is already a load of apartments that are empty or used by the authorities because no one can afford to pay the high rent, because one usually lives in a rental apartment when one is a student or saving for a new apartment (R37).

This issue is also broached by another female resident, this time from the Hammarby neighbourhood. She says that "There are enough expensive apartments. We who have low incomes do not have the

possibility to live ‘nice and fresh’ [like others] because of the high level of rents” (R6). In a similar statement, another female resident, this time from the Jakobsberg neighbourhood, says that: “There are already so many apartments that only high-income earners can afford them. Rents increase while the people’s wage level is unchanged” (R280). From these statements, we can interpret the category “enough expensive housing” both as abundant but too expensive and as higher-end housing already exists in their neighbourhood or elsewhere in the city. Here, we separate the availability and affordability of expensive apartments into different factors (Table 5).

There are two lesser, but still important and related, issues raised by residents from all three neighbourhoods that are not touched on in the literature review, and which are also specific for negative attitudes to impending gentrification. Firstly, echoing the main reason underpinning resistance to the gentrification of the Hammarby neighbourhood in 2019 (Gergis, 2021), respondents fear that green areas will be sacrificed to make way for the construction of new buildings. For instance, a female resident of the Pettersberg neighbourhood expresses that there is a need to “Preserve the green areas that we already have” (R228). Secondly, some residents believe that their neighbourhood does not have the necessary infrastructure to support a gentrification process (Table 5). This belief is captured by a female resident of the Hammarby neighbourhood who is not without a sense of irony when she says that:

It is crowded here. We already have so many hulks of apartment houses that there isn’t enough room for air and sunlight to get through them. People can’t live in a total eclipse” (R467).

In other words, if impending gentrification implies a probable loss of green spaces and possible densification of one’s neighbourhood, it will certainly engender consternation among a considerable number of residents (Table 5) and may even encourage organized resistance to impending gentrification (Gergis, 2021). These factors do not fall outside the parameters of research on attitudes to ongoing or completed gentrification processes. However, it is important to note that these are issues that arise both before, during and after gentrification (Lees, 2008). Therefore, the critique of gentrification has more depth than it, at first glance, may appear to have.

6. Conclusions and discussion

To conclude, our bottom-up perspective on urban development provides hands-on evidence that unearths issues not normally found in the debate about gentrification pressures. The Västerås case shows that old predictors of working-class attitudes to gentrification, such as gender, tenurial system, and social context, lack explanatory value prior to its enactment. That is, they do not always align with preconceived notions of gentrification derived from the debate. Instead, other factors associated with ongoing or completed gentrification are pertinent to our analysis, but there is a curious twist. On the one hand, “age” still matters because most older residents, based on prior experiences, will endorse gentrification (Fell & Widell, 2024; Sullivan, 2007). On the other hand, we find that younger residents are significantly more negative to the prospect of gentrification. Therefore, we expand beyond previous findings concerning housing’s increasing unaffordability (Doucet, 2009; Sullivan, 2007) to include young residents’ class awareness. Moreover, we find that residents living in ethically mixed traditional working-class neighbourhoods (with a history of resistance to city-planning) are more likely than their counterparts living in poorer neighbourhoods to challenge the outcomes of the current Swedish housing policy (Baeten et al., 2017). This conclusion reignites old criticisms pertaining to *how* democratic the dismantling of the public housing sector is (Grundström & Molina, 2016; Listerborn et al., 2020).

A chronology of gentrification surfaces when our findings and those presented in the literature review communicate with each other. That is, we *connect the dots* of past and present attitudes to gentrification. For

instance, based on previous research (Lees, 2008), the five-to-six-decade-old belief that an increase in housing availability and a more balanced housing mix will create the conditions for a trickle-down effect is still shared by half of the respondents in our study. This implies that this belief does not diminish over time and is still prevalent. Furthermore, attitudes concerning property value and affordability, as well as poverty and crime (Sullivan, 2007), also withstand the passage of time. On a more negative note, the fears of young residents concerning vulnerable resident groups essentially come true. That is, some residents will be evicted and/or displaced (Lees, 2008; Thörn & Holgersson, 2016). Nevertheless, although the expression of class awareness is tangible, it goes mostly unnoticed (Lees & Ferreri, 2016). This is compounded by the fact that residents are, to begin with, aware that there is an abundance of expensive apartments elsewhere in the city. These findings, particularly concerning affordability combined with the question “why just their neighbourhood is to be developed”, reveal some of the reasons why the new housing policy intervention schemes in Sweden are considered by residents as carrying the risk of gentrification.

As we mentioned earlier, our findings could be explained by the wording of our main question (Table A2) since we do not prime respondents to think about retail and amenities. Nevertheless, we ruled this possibility out since the mention of expensive housing engenders a belief among some respondents that their neighbourhood will, in a general sense, become more exclusive, often in terms of increased property value and more retail and amenities (Doucet, 2009). Conversely, the promise of access to new amenities does not, as we show, originate from the expressed needs of residents in working-class neighbourhoods. Despite this, the promise of new amenities is often used by city-planners and politicians alike to gain broader legitimacy for revitalization (Lees, 2008; Uitermark et al., 2023). From these conclusions, we show that municipal housing companies need to reflect on why the working-class’s “voiced fears” of gentrification fall on deaf ears and why the promises intrinsic to revitalization are, for all intents and purposes, empty (Doucet, 2009; Paton, 2009).

Although a small majority of residents in working-class neighbourhoods are, from the outset, highly conscious of the consequences that gentrification entails, this process of spatial segregation still continues unabated and highlights how the present neoliberal housing regime contributes to social inequalities. Subsequently, we ask: To what extent should the working-class’s negative attitude to the middle-class’s settlement of their neighbourhoods be taken more seriously by politicians and city-planners? There are at least three perspectives on urban planning that together contribute to providing us with a tentative answer. They stress the importance of democratic communication (Drapper, 2024), community dialogue (Bernstein & Isaac, 2023) and taking the self-respect of residents into account (Wells, 2022). Combined, all of these perspectives recommend deliberations between concerned parties prior to gentrification (Fell & Mattsson, 2021; Hyra, 2015; Young, 1999). As it now stands, communities in working-class neighbourhoods are still subject to expert-oriented public administration (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010). However, as we have shown, there are informative platforms that enable residents to question gentrification by, inter alia, writing letters to the editors of local newspapers and/or by utilizing or establishing associations (which is a good example of citizen engagement) to appeal plans that may (or may not) induce impending gentrification (Svensk författningssamling, 2025:519). Notably, for whatever reason, not all residents have utilized these procedures to express their views and engage with politicians, civil servants, and private actors concerning plans to develop, or redevelop, their neighbourhoods. With the dilemma of city-planning in mind, a complementary bottom-up approach where plans for gentrification are deliberated with concerned residents (Soneryd & Lindh, 2018), but outside of the traditional bulletin board announcement procedure (Svensk författningssamling, 2025:519), could more easily gain traction in local community contexts. This has already happened in a limited sense in the Hammarby neighbourhood (Gergis, 2021).

One limitation in our study is that we sort residents into foreign born and Swedish-born categories. Hence, although included in the Swedish-born category, we omit a foreign *background* category from our analysis. Another limitation with our study is the underrepresentation of foreign born respondents in the Pettersberg and Hammarby neighbourhoods. Finally, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we used an online survey that required a smartphone to access. As a result, we understand that there is a risk that some (older) residents were less familiar with the technology and, thus, may have been discouraged from participating in the survey.

Our findings provide future urban research with an opportunity to pose new questions and, hence, accumulate alternative explanations of attitudes to gentrification. Will young residents' class awareness, or the perception that there are already enough expensive apartments elsewhere in the city, mobilize resistance to future plans to revitalize working-class neighbourhoods? Finally, will residents resist gentrification because it might lead to a significant loss of green spaces, or because they harbour concerns that there is an insufficient infrastructure for the construction of new homes in their neighbourhood?

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Terence Fell: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft,

Appendix A. Appendices

Table A1
Survey questions and measures.

Question ID	Field	Question	Survey	Measures
1	Gender	What is your gender? - Female - Male - Non-binary	Both	Yes/no
2	Age	What year are you born?	Both	Open-ended
3	Educational attainment	What is your level of education? - Primary - Secondary - University	Both	Yes/no
4	Occupation	Are you employed? - Paid work - Self-employed - Job seeker - Sick leave - Student - Retired	Both	Yes/no
5	Swedish-born	Are you born in Sweden?	Both	Yes/no
6	Residency	Where do you live? - Jakobsberg - Hammarby - Pettersberg	Both	Yes/no
7	Time in neighbourhood	How many years have you lived there?	Both	Open-ended
8	Tenurial system	What is your current system of tenure? - Owner - Renter	Both	Yes/no
9	Type of housing	What is your current housing type? - Apartment - Row-house - House	Both	Yes/no
10	Rent	What is your rent/fee? - 0–5000 SEK	Both	Yes/no

(continued on next page)

Table A1 (continued)

Question ID	Field	Question	Survey	Measures
11	Physical context	- 5001–7500 SEK - 7501–10,000 SEK - 10,001- SEK On a scale of 1–5 how crucial were the following alternatives for residential satisfaction?	Both	Scale of quality where 1 = very bad, 5 = very good
12	Social context	- Attractiveness - Infrastructure - Public transport - Outdoor activities On a scale of 1–5 how crucial were the following alternatives for residential satisfaction?	Both	Scale of quality where 1 = very bad, 5 = very good
13	Neighbourhood perception	- Trust - Security - Community - Associations On a scale of 1–3 how do you rate the following neighbourhoods?	Both	Scale of quality where 1 = negative, 3 = positive
14	Gentrification	- Bäckby (emergent) - Haga (traditional) - Öster Mälarstrand (affluent) What is your attitude to plans to construct buildings with expensive rental apartments and condominiums in your neighbourhood?	Both	Positive/negative
15	Stance	If positive, why?	Both	Open-ended
16	Stance	If negative, why?	Both	Open-ended

Table A2

The representativity of the sample 2020 (%). Source: Statistics Sweden.

Indicators	Neighbourhood			
	Jakobsberg	Hammarby	Pettersberg	Average
Survey response rate(/households)	149 (20)	277 (25)	168 (11)	594 (17)
Gender (male)	780 (48)	1310 (50)	1813 (50)	3903 (50)
Gender survey (male)	0.435 (44)	0.458 (46)	0.488 (49)	0.460 (46)
Mean age	45.8	38.4	36.8	40.3
Mean age survey	48.8	44.7	41.9	45.1
Swedish-born	1425 (88)	1450 (55)	1648 (46)	4343 (55)
Swedish-born survey (mean)	0.087 (91)	0.271 (73)	0.369 (63)	0.242 (76)
Education (primary)	147 (9)	570 (22)	848 (24)	1565 (20)
Education (secondary)	468 (29)	856 (33)	1063 (30)	2387 (30)
Education (university)	740 (45)	589 (22)	700 (19)	2029 (26)
Education survey (mean)	2.638 (high)	2.365 (medium)	2.274 (low)	2.426
Housing type (apartment)	677 (41)	1407 (53)	3278 (91)	5362 (68)
Housing type (house/chain house)	936 (58)	1167 (44)	206 (6)	2309 (29)
Housing type survey (mean)	1.899 (houses)	1.769 (mixed)	1.125 (apartments)	1.598

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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