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• 51.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality2011Inngår i: International Game Theory Review, ISSN 0219-1989, Vol. 13, nr 4, s. 443-459Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We introduce negative externalities in the form of ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player's utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all the players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a certain assumption of bounded rationality we derive a straightforward notion of stable outcomes as certain conjectural equilibria. We prove that several well-known properties of the set of stable outcomes in the assignment game carry over to this new game. Â© 2011 World Scientific Publishing Company.

• 52.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden. ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
A New Look at Individual Differences in Perceptions of Unfairness: The Theory of Maximally Unfair Allocations in Multiparty Situations2015Inngår i: Social Justice Research, ISSN 0885-7466, E-ISSN 1573-6725, Vol. 28, nr 4, s. 401-414Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Previous research has demonstrated that unfairness judgments of resource allocations become more complex when there are more than two recipients. In order to explain some of this complexity, we propose a set of psychological mechanisms that may underlie four different choices of maximally unfair resource allocations (MUA): Self-Single-Loser, Self-One-Loser-of-Many, Self-Single-Winner, and Self-One-Winner-of-Many. From this psychological theory, several predictions are derived and tested in vignette studies involving a total of 708 participants recruited online using MTurk. As predicted by our theory, (1) choices of MUA where there is a single loser were much more common when the allocated resource was of negative rather than positive valence, and (2) the amount of egoistic bias individuals exhibited when judging the unfairness in receiving a small rather than a large share in a non-extreme multi-party allocation was predicted by their choices of MUA. These findings suggest that an individual’s choice of MUA reveals some generally relevant principles of how unfairness is perceived in multi-party allocations. This opens up new lines of inquiry, especially regarding research on social dilemmas and social value orientation.

• 53.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Vad vet vi om hyresregleringens effekter?2005Inngår i: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, nr 4, s. 31-44Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)

Hyresreglering framställs ibland som ett säkert sätt att förstöra en bostadsmarknad och ibland som det som räddar oss från att centrala delar av storstäderna helt tas över av rika hushåll. I denna artikel sammanställs resultaten från ett antal empiriska studier om effekterna av den svenska hyresregleringen på t ex

bostadsbyggande och segregation. Slutsatsen är att många föreställningar om hyresregleringens negativa såväl som positiva effekter är överdrivna. Det största problemet är att regleringen skapar en svart marknad som blir en grogrund för kriminell verksamhet och som medför att illegala transaktioner uppfattas som mer legitima när de framstår som enda sättet att få tag i bostäder i vissa områden.

• 54.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Uppsala universitet, Sweden.
Encoding of Numerical Information in Memory: Magnitude or Nominal?2017Inngår i: Journal of Numerical Cognition, ISSN 2363-8761, Vol. 3, nr 1, s. 58-76Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

In studies of long-term memory of multi-digit numbers the leading digit tends to be recalled correctly more often than less significant digits, which has been interpreted as evidence for an analog magnitude encoding of the numbers. However, upon closer examination of data from one of these studies we found that the distribution of recall errors does not fit a model based on analog encoding. Rather, the data suggested an alternative hypothesis that each digit of a number is encoded separately in long-term memory, and that encoding of one or more digits sometimes fails due to insufficient attention in which case they are simply guessed when recall is requested, with no regard for the presented value. To test this hypothesis of nominal encoding with value-independent mistakes, we conducted two studies with a total of 1,080 adults who were asked to recall a single piece of numerical information that had been presented in a story they had read earlier. The information was a three-digit number, manipulated between subjects with respect to its value (between 193 and 975), format (Arabic digits or words), and what it counted (baseball caps or grains of sand). Results were consistent with our hypothesis. Further, the leading digit was recalled correctly more often than less significant digits when the number was presented in Arabic digits but not when the number was presented in words; our interpretation of this finding is that the latter format does not focus readers’ attention on the leading digit.

• 55.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm University, Sweden.
Stockholm University, Sweden.
Injunctive Versus Functional Inferences From Descriptive Norms: Comment on Gelfand and Harrington2015Inngår i: Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, ISSN 0022-0221, E-ISSN 1552-5422, Vol. 46, nr 10, s. 1330-1332Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
• 56.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Nöjesmatematik2003Bok (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
• 57.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, United States .
Poverty Prefers Company2014Inngår i: Social Psychology and Personality Science, ISSN 1948-5506, E-ISSN 1948-5514, Vol. 5, nr 3, s. 319-325Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

In three web-based experiments, we show that both actual poverty and experimentally induced (imagined) poverty create a preference for greater inequality. Study 1, a cross-national comparison between Americans and Swedes, showed that respondents who were actually poor and those who were experimentally induced to imagine that they were poor tended to express a heightened preference for greater inequality, and for a higher proportion of poor citizens. Study 2 replicated the effects using different procedures. Study 3 showed that imagining oneself being poor increases preferences for a greater proportion of poor people, but imagining oneself being rich does not increase preferences for a greater proportion of rich people. This poverty prefers company effect might affect support for policies aiming at reducing the number of poor people.

• 58.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
University of South Carolina.
The available evidence suggests the percent measure should not be used to study inequality: Reply to Norton and Ariely2013Inngår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 8, nr 3, s. 395-396Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

In this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small. © 2013. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

• 59.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Univ S Carolina, USA.
Deception and price in a market with asymmetric information2007Inngår i: Judgment and Decision Making, ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 2, nr 1, s. 23-28Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))

In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonetheless, in an experimental study we find that most people make honest declarations, which is in line with recent findings that lies damaging another party are costly in terms of the liar's utility. Moreover, we find in this experimental market that deceptive sellers offer lower prices than honest sellers, which could possibly be explained by the same wish to limit the damage to the other party. However, when the recipient of the offer is a social tie we find no evidence for lower prices of deceptive offers, which seems to indicate that the rationale for the lower price in deceptive offers to strangers is in fact profit-seeking (by making the deal more attractive) rather than moral.

• 60.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, United States of America.
Editorial Decisions May Perpetuate Belief in Invalid Research Findings2013Inngår i: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 8, nr 9, s. Art.num. 73364-Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Social psychology and related disciplines are seeing a resurgence of interest in replication, as well as actual replication efforts. But prior work suggests that even a clear demonstration that a finding is invalid often fails to shake acceptance of the finding. This threatens the full impact of these replication efforts. Here we show that the actions of two key players - journal editors and the authors of original (invalidated) research findings - are critical to the broader public's continued belief in an invalidated research conclusion. Across three experiments, we show that belief in an invalidated finding falls sharply when a critical failed replication is published in the same - versus different - journal as the original finding, and when the authors of the original finding acknowledge that the new findings invalidate their conclusions. We conclude by discussing policy implications of our key findings.

• 61.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
University of South Carolina.
Emotional reactions to losing explain gender differences in entering a risky lottery2010Inngår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 5, nr 3, s. 159-163Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

A gender difference in risk preferences, with women being more averse to risky choices, is a robust experimental finding. Speculating on the sources of this difference, Croson and Gneezy recently pointed to the tendency for women to experience emotions more strongly and suggested that feeling more strongly about negative outcomes would lead to greater risk-aversion. Here we test this hypothesis in an international survey with 424 respondents from India and 416 from US where we ask questions about a hypothetical lottery. In both countries we find that emotions about outcomes are stronger among women, and that this effect partially mediates gender difference in willingness to enter the lottery.

• 62.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
University of South Carolina.
Perceptions of unfairness in allocations between multiple recipients2011Inngår i: Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 0010-0285, E-ISSN 1095-5623, Vol. 62, nr 3, s. 225-244Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

This paper introduces a new model to explain perceptions of unfairness in resource allocations between multiple recipients. The model yields several novel predictions, all confirmed in a series of new empirical tests. For instance, while much prior research focuses on the differences between the judge’s share and others’ shares, we argue that people also care about differences between others’ shares. In particular, the presence of a single loser increases perceptions of unfairness. We also study individual variation in sensitivity to the single-loser dimension. Most centrally, we offer empirical support for the existence – indeed the prevalence – of ostraphobics, individuals with an acute sensitivity to being “ostracized” as a sole loser. We show that ostraphobics perceive unfairness more strongly than other types, are higher in need to belong and fear of negative evaluation, and are more prone to a heretofore unrecognized type of preference reversal with respect to fairness.

• 63.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Univ of South Carolina.
What do Americans know about inequality? It depends on how you ask them2012Inngår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 7, nr 6, s. 741-745Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

A recent survey of inequality (Norton and Ariely, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 9–12) asked respondents to indicate what percent of the nation’s total wealth is—and should be—controlled by richer and poorer quintiles of the U.S. population. We show that such measures lead to powerful anchoring effects that account for the otherwise remarkable findings that respondents reported perceiving, and desiring, extremely low inequality in wealth. We show that the same anchoring effects occur in other domains, namely web page popularity and school teacher salaries. We introduce logically equivalent questions about average levels of inequality that lead to more accurate responses. Finally, when we made respondents aware of the logical connection between the two measures, the majority said that typical responses to the average measures, indicating higher levels of inequality, better reflected their actual perceptions and preferences than did typical responses to percent measures.

• 64.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm Univ, Ctr Cultural Evolut, Stockholm, Sweden.
Univ South Carolina, Dept Sociol, Columbia, SC 29208 USA.. Stockholm Univ, Ctr Cultural Evolut, Stockholm, Sweden..
Political double standards in reliance on moral foundations2019Inngår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 14, nr 4, s. 440-454Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Prior research using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) has established that political ideology is associated with self-reported reliance on specific moral foundations in moral judgments of acts. MFQ items do not specify the agents involved in the acts, however. By specifying agents in MFQ items we revealed blatant political double standards. Conservatives thought that the same moral foundation was more relevant if victims were agents that they like (i.e., corporations and other conservatives) but less relevant when the same agents were perpetrators. Liberals showed the same pattern for agents that they like (i.e., news media and other liberals). A UK sample showed much weaker political double standards with respect to corporations and news media, consistent with feelings about corporations and news media being much less politicized in the UK than in the US. We discuss the implications for moral foundations theory.

• 65.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Tal och Rum: NT kurs CD2008Bok (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
• 66.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Royal Inst Technol.
Limiting shapes of birth-and-death processes on Young diagrams2012Inngår i: Advances in Applied Mathematics, ISSN 0196-8858, E-ISSN 1090-2074, Vol. 48, nr 4, s. 575-602Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We consider a family of birth processes and birth-and-death processes on Young diagrams of integer partitions of n. This family incorporates three famous models from very different fields: Rost's totally asymmetric particle model (in discrete time), Simon's urban growth model, and Moran's infinite alleles model. We study stationary distributions and limit shapes as n tends to infinity, and present a number of results and conjectures.

• 67.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Royal Institute of Technology,Stockholm, Sweden .
On two theorems of Quinzii and rent controlled housing allocation in Sweden2007Inngår i: International Game Theory Review, ISSN 0219-1989, Vol. 9, nr 3, s. 515-526Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

The Swedish rent control system creates a white market for swapping rental contracts and a black market for selling rental contracts. Empirical data suggests that in this black-and-white market some people act according to utility functions that are both discontinuous and locally decreasing in money. We discuss Quinzii's theorem for the nonemptiness of the core of generalized house-swapping games, and show how it can be extended to cover the Swedish game. In a second part, we show how this theorem of Quinzii and her second theorem on nonemptiness of the core in two-sided models are both special cases of a more general theorem.

• 68.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik. Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences2008Inngår i: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 36, nr 3-4, s. 421-440Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

A fundamental fact in two-sided matching is that if a market allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome. We study a related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market where agents enter and search for a mate for at most n rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, we find that this game has multiple equilibria, some of which are highly asymmetric between sexes. We also investigate how the set of equilibria depends on a sex difference in the outside option of not being mated at all.

• 69.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik. Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem2007Inngår i: Operations Research, ISSN 0030-364X, Vol. 55, nr 5, s. 921-931Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.

• 70.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik. Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Optimal stopping in a two-sided secretary problem2004Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
• 71.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
KTH. Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences2006Inngår i: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 52, nr 1, s. 77-87Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three genders (3GSM). Alkan [Alkan, A., 1988. Non-existence of stable threesome matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences 16, 207–209] showed that not all instances of 3GSM allow stable matchings. Boros et al. [Boros, E., Gurvich, V., Jaslar, S., Krasner, D., 2004. Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences. Discrete Mathematics 286, 1–10] showed that if preferences are cyclic, and the number of agents is limited to three of each gender, then a stable matching always exists. Here we extend this result to four agents of each gender. We also show that a number of well-known sufficient conditions for stability do not apply to cyclic 3GSM. Based on computer search, we formulate a conjecture on stability of “strongest link” 3GSM, which would imply stability of cyclic 3GSM.

• 72.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
Group differences in broadness of values may drive dynamics of public opinion on moral issues2015Inngår i: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 77, s. 1-8Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Here we propose the idea that the success of an argument in favor of an issue position should depend on whether the argument resonates with the audience's values. Now consider two groups, one of which has a broader set of values than the other. We develop a mathematical model to investigate how this difference in broadness of values may drive a change on the population level towards positions in line with the more narrow set of values. The model is motivated by the empirical finding that conservative morality rests equally on moral foundations that are individualizing (harm and fairness) and binding (purity, authority, and ingroup), whereas liberal morality relies mainly on the individualizing moral foundations. The model then predicts that, under certain conditions, the whole population will tend to move towards positions on moral issues (e.g., same-sex marriage) that are supported by individualizing moral foundations.

• 73.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm University, Sweden.
Stockholm University, Sweden. Linköping University, Sweden. American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States. Saint Petersburg State University, Russian Federation. Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan. University of Delaware, United States. American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. Delve Pvt Ltd, Pakistan. Gonzaga University, United States. Shandong Normal University, China. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation. Beijing Normal University, China. Hitotsubashi University, Japan.
Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment2017Inngår i: Management and Organization Review, ISSN 1740-8776, E-ISSN 1740-8784, Vol. 13, nr 4, s. 851-870Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

• 74.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Stockholm University.
Biases for acquiring information individually rather than socially2009Inngår i: Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, ISSN 0737-4828, Vol. 7, nr 4, s. 309-329Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We discuss theoretical and empirical arguments for a human bias to acquire information individually rather than socially. In particular, we argue that when other people can be observed, information collection is a public good and hence some of the individual variation in the choice between individual and social learning can be explained by variation in social value orientation. We conducted two experimental studies, based on the game Explore & Collect, to test the predictions that (1) socially and individually acquired information of equal objective value are treated differently, and (2) prosocial subjects tend to spend more effort than selfish subjects on individual acquiring of information. Both predictions were supported.

• 75.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Stockhom Univ.
Partner Search Heuristics in the Lab: Stability of Matchings Under Various Preference Structures2009Inngår i: Adaptive Behavior, ISSN 1059-7123, E-ISSN 1741-2633, Vol. 17, nr 6, s. 524-536Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

When agents search for partners, the outcome is a matching. K. Eriksson and O. Häggström (2008)defined a measure of instability of matchings and proved that under a certain partner search heuristic,outcomes are likely to have low instability. They also showed that with regards to stability, the preferencestructure known as common preferences lie somewhere in between the extreme cases of homotypicand antithetical preferences. Following up on this theoretical work, we let human subjectssearch for a good partner in a computer game where preferences were set to be either common,homotypic, or antithetical. We find that total search effort and instability of the outcome vary in thepredicted ways with the preference structure and the number of agents. A set of simulations showthat these results are consistent with a model where agents use a simple search heuristic with a slightpossibility of error.

• 76.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Center for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Sweden.
Linköping University Institute for Analytical Sociology, Sweden.
Spontaneous associations and label framing have similar effects in the public goods game2014Inngår i: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 9, nr 5, s. 360-372Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e.g., "The Teamwork Game") can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled "The Teamwork Game" tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.

• 77.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Stockholm University.
The devil is in the details: Incorrect intuitions in optimal search2010Inngår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 75, s. 338-347Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

n the classic Secretary Problem it has been established that people tend to search somewhat less than is optimal, and a number of explanations have been suggested. Here we propose a new explanation, the Similar-But-Incorrect Intuitions Hypothesis, which says that suboptimal search behavior is to be expected because optimal strategies vary disproportionately with subtle details of the search problem setup, whereas people seem to entertain general intuitions about optimal search. We find support for this hypothesis in experiments on a new search problem, the Explore-and-Collect Problem, where the player collects utility from an option every time it is tried and options can be recalled. Although the optimal search effort in this problem is much smaller than for the Secretary Problem, people tend to search only marginally less. This is not predicted by previous explanations for suboptimal search.

• 78.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Stockholm University.
The hard problem of cooperation2012Inngår i: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 7, nr 7, s. e40325-Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the “hard problem of cooperation” as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.

• 79.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm University, Sweden.
Stockholm University, Sweden. Stockholm University, Sweden.
Bidirectional associations between descriptive and injunctive norms2015Inngår i: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, ISSN 0749-5978, E-ISSN 1095-9920, Vol. 127, s. 59-69Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Modern research on social norms makes an important distinction between descriptive norms (how people commonly behave) and injunctive norms (what one is morally obligated to do). Here we propose that this distinction is far from clear in the cognition of social norms. In a first study, using the implicit association test, the concepts of "common" and "moral" were found to be strongly associated. Some implications of this automatic common-moral association were investigated in a subsequent series of experiments: Our participants tended to make explicit inferences from descriptive norms to injunctive norms and vice versa; they tended to mix up descriptive and injunctive concepts in recall tasks; and frequency information influenced participants' own moral judgments. We conclude by discussing how the common-moral association could play a role in the dynamics of social norms.

• 80.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Stockholm University. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights2013Inngår i: Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, ISSN 1789-2082, E-ISSN 1589-7397, Vol. 11, nr 1, s. 17-34Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments where punishment is free for all. We report a public goods game experiment in which a condition where punishment rights were restricted to one other player per player yielded higher total welfare than a condition with unrestricted punishment. In the restricted punishment condition, there was much less punishment but high levels of cooperation were achieved nonetheless. This indicates that it may be beneficial to groups to restrict punishment rights. In a second study we presented respondents from many different countries with three scenarios constituting everyday social dilemmas of various kinds. Across countries, respondents tended to judge it as inappropriate for most involved parties to punish selfish individuals in the scenarios. Typically, only one party was judged to have the right to punish. Whereas much prior work has considered punishment as a public good that needs to be encouraged, these findings suggest that informal norms about sanctions tend to constrain punishment to certain individuals. Such norms may serve the function to harness the positive effects of punishment while containing the negative effects, and we suggest that they are likely to arise from learning.

• 81.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Institutet för framtidsstudier. Institutet för framtidsstudier. University of South Carolina, USA.
Generosity Pays: Selfish People Have Fewer Children and Earn Less MoneyInngår i: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, ISSN 0022-3514, E-ISSN 1939-1315Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Does selfishness pay in the long term? Previous research has indicated that being otherish rather than selfish has positive consequences for psychological well-being, physical health, and relationships. Here we instead examine the consequences for individuals’ income and number of children, as these are the currencies that matter most in theories that emphasize the power of self-interest, namely economics and evolutionary thinking. Drawing on both cross-sectional (Studies 1 and 2) and panel data (Studies 3 and 4), we find that otherish individuals tend to have more children and higher income than selfish individuals. An additional survey (Study 5) of lay beliefs about how self-interest impacts income and fertility gives an indication of why selfish people persist in their behaviour even though it leads to poorer outcomes: people generally expect selfish individuals to have higher incomes. Our findings have implications for lay decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, as well as for economic and evolutionary theories of human behavior.

• 82.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm Univ, Stockholm, Sweden.
Republicans Value Agency, Democrats Value Communion2018Inngår i: Social psychology quarterly, ISSN 0190-2725, E-ISSN 1939-8999, Vol. 81, nr 2, s. 173-184Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Drawing on the theory of the Big Two content dimensions of social judgmentagency and communionthe author proposes that several findings about partisan differences in the United States can be integrated into one hypothesis: Republicans tend to put greater value on agency, while Democrats put greater value on communion. Moreover, on the basis of these values, Republicans and Democrats should judge their own groups as particularly superior on agency and communion, respectively. These hypotheses gained support in three studies on partisan values and ingroup bias, suggesting that the agency-communion framework may be useful for researchers studying how political groups differ in their worldviews, biases, and attitudes.

• 83.
University of Pennsylvania, USA.
Stockholm University, USA. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm University, Sweden.
Biased perception may trump rational intention: Most people think they are less corrupt than average2015Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)

From a game theoretic point of view, a social norm can sometimes be considered as a Nash equilibrium in a coordination game. Here we point out a psychological reason why such a social norm might erode, even if it is beneficial and agents have rational intentions. The reason is a well-established bias in interpersonal perception, the better-than-average effect. Psychological research on this bias has mainly focused on skills and personality attributes, rather than normative behavior. In a series of online surveys, we demonstrate that the better-than-average effect applies also to judgments of the likelihood to engage in petty corruption, a very important domain of social norms. We conclude that this psychological bias may be a factor that contributes to the difficulty of establishing noncorruption.

• 84.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Discrete Mathematics and Discrete Models2015 (oppl. 1)Bok (Annet vitenskapelig)
• 85.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Tal och Rum: Didaktiska kommentarer2009Annet (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))

Lärarhandledning till Tal och Rum, del A och B

• 86.
Linköping University, Sweden.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholms University, Sweden.
Cooperation and Shared Beliefs about Trust in the Assurance Game2015Inngår i: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 10, nr 12, artikkel-id e0144191Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Determinants of cooperation include ingroup vs. outgroup membership, and individual traits, such as prosociality and trust. We investigated whether these factors can be overridden by beliefs about people's trust. We manipulated the information players received about each other's level of general trust, "high" or "low". These levels were either measured (Experiment 1) or just arbitrarily assigned labels (Experiment 2). Players' choices whether to cooperate or defect in a stag hunt (or an assurance game)-where it is mutually beneficial to cooperate, but costly if the partner should fail to do so-were strongly predicted by what they were told about the other player's trust label, as well as by what they were told that the other player was told about their own label. Our findings demonstrate the importance for cooperation in a risky coordination game of both first- and second-order beliefs about how much people trust each other. This supports the idea that institutions can influence cooperation simply by influencing beliefs.

• 87.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Trusting You Trusting Me: The Importance of Beliefs about Trust in the Stag Hunt/Assurance GameManuskript (preprint) (Annet vitenskapelig)

In the coordination game known as the stag hunt or the assurance game, players face a choice between a risk-free strategy and a risky strategy that pays higher if chosen also by the other player. Such games are commonly described as trust problems because the risky strategy is a rational choice only if one expects the other player to choose it. Here we argue that the stag hunt ought to be about trust only in an indirect and recursive waywhere beliefs about trust are more important than actual trust. On the basis of an established trust questionnaire we categorised 323 participants as having either high or low trust. They then played series of stag hunt games with varying amounts of information (either none, or private or common) about trust levels of involved parties. In line with our predictions, a player’s strategy choice was not strongly predicted by his or her trust level unless the latter was common knowledge. In other words, a high (low) truster Ego is more likely to play the risky (risk-free) strategy if Ego knows that Alter knows Ego’s trust level, emphasising the importance of beliefs about trust.

• 88.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Institutet för framtidsstudier, Sweden. Institutet för framtidsstudier, Sweden. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Public opinion change explained by the moral psychology of liberals and conservatives2018Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
• 89.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan, Stockholm.
Limit shapes of stable configurations of a generalized Bulgarian solitaireInngår i: Order, ISSN 0167-8094, E-ISSN 1572-9273, ISSN 0167-8094Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)

Bulgarian solitaire is played on n cards divided into several piles; a move consists of picking one card from each pile to form a new pile. In a recent generalization, $\sigma$-Bulgarian solitaire,  the number of cards you pick from a pile is some function $\sigma$ of the pile size, such that you pick $\sigma(h) \le h$ cards from a pile of size h. Here we consider a special class of such functions. Let us call $\sigma$ well-behaved if $\sigma(1)=1$ and if both $\sigma(h)$ and $h-\sigma(h)$ are non-decreasing functions of h. Well-behaved $\sigma$-Bulgarian solitaire has a geometric interpretation in terms of layers at certain levels being picked in each move. It also satisfies that if a stable configuration of n cards exists it is unique. Moreover, if piles are sorted in order of decreasing size ($\lambda_1 \ge \lambda_2\ge \dots$) then a configuration is convex if and only if it is a stable configuration of some well-behaved  $\sigma$-Bulgarian solitaire. If sorted configurations are represented by Young diagrams and scaled down to have unit height and unit area, the stable configurations corresponding to an infinite sequence of well-behaved functions ($\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$) may tend to a limit shape $\phi$. We show that every convex $\phi$ with certain properties can arise as the limit shape of some sequence of well-behaved $\sigma_n$. For the special case when $\sigma_n(h)=\lceil q_n h \rceil$ for $0 < q_n \le 1$, these limit shapes are triangular (in case $q_n^2 n\rightarrow 0$), or exponential (in case $q_n^2 n\rightarrow \infty$), or interpolating between these shapes (in case $q_n^2 n\rightarrow C>0$).

• 90.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan, Sweden.
Markov chains on graded posets: Compatibility of up-directed and down-directed transition probabilities2018Inngår i: Order, ISSN 0167-8094, E-ISSN 1572-9273, ISSN 0167-8094, nr 1, s. 93-109Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We consider two types of discrete-time Markov chains where thestate space is a graded poset and the transitionsare taken along the covering relations in the poset. The first type of Markov chain goes only in one direction, either up or down in the poset (an up chain or down chain). The second type toggles between two adjacent rank levels (an up-and-down chain). We introduce two compatibility concepts between the up-directed transition probabilities (an up rule) and the down-directed(a down rule), and we relate these to compatibility betweenup-and-down chains. This framework is used to prove a conjecture about a limit shape for a process on Young's lattice. Finally, we settle the questions whether the reverse of an up chain is a down chain for some down rule and whether there exists an up or down chain at all if the rank function is not bounded.

• 91.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Stockholm Univ., Sweden.
Stockholm Univ., Sweden. Stockholm Univ., Sweden. Stockholm Univ., Sweden.
Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction2017Inngår i: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, ISSN 0022-1031, E-ISSN 1096-0465, Vol. 69, s. 59-64Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

The ultimatum game is a common economic experiment in which some participants reject another's unfair offer of how to split some money, even though it leaves them both worse off. This costly behavior can be seen as enforcement of a fairness norm and has been labeled "altruistic punishment", suggesting that it is a Moral thing to do. But is this behavior viewed as moral by participants? Is it viewed as punishment? And are the payoff consequences of the behavior sufficient to determine the answers to these questions? To investigate this we framed costly punishment in two different ways: either as rejection of an offer (the standard ultimatum game framing) or as reduction of payoff. In a series of paid and hypothetical experiments we found that moral concerns about costly punishment depended on the framing. Specifically, the reduction frame elicited more moral concern about, and less use of, costly punishment than did the rejection frame. Several implications are discussed.

• 92.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för samhälls- och beteendevetenskap.
Making gender matter: The role of gender-based expectancies and gender identification on women’s and men’s math performance in Sweden2007Inngår i: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, Vol. 48, nr 4, s. 329-338Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

It is well established that an emphasis on gender differences may have negative effect on women's math performance in USA, Germany and the Netherlands. It has further been found that an individual’s identification with the stereotyped group may moderate effects of negative stereotypes. The present study investigated how gender-based expectancies affected the math performance of women and men in Sweden, a nation with a smaller gender gap than in other countries, and a strong cultural emphasis on gender equality. Participants, 112 female and 74 male undergraduate math students from Swedish universities, completed a difficult math test in which their gender was either linked to their test performance or not. Men performed better than women when gender was made relevant among participants who did not see their gender as an important aspect of their identity, while participants high in gender identification were unaffected by gender identity relevance. Moreover, the gender relevance manipulation affected men's performance more than women's. The results deviate from findings on US samples, indicating that the role of group identification as a moderator of stereotype-based exepctancy effects is complex, and that factors in the cultural context may interact with individual differences in identification to determine the impact of negative stereotypes.

• 93.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för samhälls- och beteendevetenskap.
Mälardalens högskola, Institutionen för matematik och fysik.
Stereotype threat effects of women's and men’s math performance in Sweden: The protective role of gender identification2006Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
• 94. Markovsky, Barry
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Comparing Direct and Indirect Measures of Just Rewards2012Inngår i: Sociological Methods & Research, ISSN 0049-1241, E-ISSN 1552-8294, Vol. 41, nr 1, s. 199-216Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We offer the first comparison between "direct" and "indirect" methods for measuring perceptions of distributive justice in reward allocations. The direct method simply asks respondents what they would consider to be a fair salary for a particular person in a given set of circumstances. In contrast, the indirect method infers fair salaries from respondents' judgments about the relative unfairness of hypothetical salaries. The particular indirect method that we will assess is a vignette survey technique pioneered by Jasso and Rossi (1977) and used in a number of more recent publications. The vignettes describe characteristics of a hypothetical employee, with the objective of deriving what respondents believe to be the just reward for that employee. Our experimental test suggests that the two methods yield incompatible results and that neither is immune to bias. The indirect method also suffers from a type of specification error that leads to untenable results. We conclude by suggesting directions for new research to gain a better understanding of these problems and, ultimately, to circumvent them.

• 95.
University of South Carolina.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Comparing direct and indirect measures of just rewards: What have we learned?2012Inngår i: Sociological Methods & Research, ISSN 0049-1241, E-ISSN 1552-8294, Vol. 41, nr 1, s. 240-245Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
• 96.
Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden.
Saint Göran Hospital, Sweden. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden .
Humor style and motor skills: Understanding vulnerability to bullying2014Inngår i: Europe's Journal of Psychology, ISSN 1841-0413, Vol. 10, nr 3, s. 480-491Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of humor style and motor skills in vulnerability to bullying. 729 adults responded to the Humor Style Questionnaire (HSQ) and items retrospectively addressing their motor skills and bullying experiences during childhood. Consistent with recent research, poorer motor skills were associated with a greater extent of having been bullied. An association between stronger motor skills and affiliative humor was found, lending support to a shared biological basis theory underlying social and motor competency processes. Most importantly, being bullied was associated with higher self-defeating humor and lower affiliative humor. This supports earlier theoretical work by Klein and Kuiper (2006) and highlights the role that humor styles play in social interactions that can promote positive peer acceptance and wellbeing.

• 97. Rendell, Luke
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
Why copy others? Insights from the social learning tournament2010Inngår i: Science, ISSN 0036-8075, E-ISSN 1095-9203, Vol. 328, nr 5975, s. 208-213Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Social learning (learning through observation or interaction with other individuals) is widespread in nature and is central to the remarkable success of humanity, yet it remains unclear why copying is profitable and how to copy most effectively. To address these questions, we organized a computer tournament in which entrants submitted strategies specifying how to use social learning and its asocial alternative (for example, trial-and-error learning) to acquire adaptive behavior in a complex environment. Most current theory predicts the emergence of mixed strategies that rely on some combination of the two types of learning. In the tournament, however, strategies that relied heavily on social learning were found to be remarkably successful, even when asocial information was no more costly than social information. Social learning proved advantageous because individuals frequently demonstrated the highest-payoff behavior in their repertoire, inadvertently filtering information for copiers. The winning strategy (discountmachine) relied nearly exclusively on social learning and weighted information according to the time since acquisition.

• 98.
University of South Carolina.
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
A lay-statistician explanation of minority discrimination2012Inngår i: Social Science Research, ISSN 0049-089X, E-ISSN 1096-0317, Vol. 41, nr 3, s. 637-645Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

We outline a new explanation of discrimination against numerical minorities. In contrast to prior work that focuses on how the content of categories affects discrimination, our argument describes how the size of categories leads to discrimination. Specifically, we argue that, when comparing multiple categories, actors tend to view larger categories as more closely approximating an underlying population than smaller ones. As a result, a decision maker will tend to expect that members of a numerical majority are more likely to be what he/she is searching for, whether it is the best or worst candidate. We report the results of two studies designed to test these arguments. To demonstrate the generality of the proposed mechanism, Study 1 tested the argument in a non-social domain. Participants disproportionately favored the majority (vs. minority) category when searching for a single winning lottery ticket, and favored the minority category when the goal was to avoid a single losing ticket. Our second study supported an additional implication of the argument in a social domain: decision makers tended to rank highly qualified majority job candidates as better than equally qualified minority candidates, and relatively unqualified majority candidates as worse than equally unqualified minority candidates.

• 99. Simpson, Brent
Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation.
The dynamics of contracts and generalized trustworthiness2009Inngår i: Rationality and Society, ISSN 1043-4631, E-ISSN 1461-7358, Vol. 21, nr 1, s. 59-80Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
• 100.
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden; Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för utbildning, kultur och kommunikation, Utbildningsvetenskap och Matematik. Centre for Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
The connection between moral positions and moral arguments drives opinion change2019Inngår i: Nature human behaviour, ISSN 2397-3374, Vol. 3, nr 9, s. 922-930Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)

Liberals and conservatives often take opposing positions on moral issues. But what makes a moral position liberal or conservative? Why does public opinion tend to become more liberal over time? And why does public opinion change especially fast on certain issues, such as gay rights? We offer an explanation based on how different positions connect with different kinds of moral arguments. Based on a formal model of opinion dynamics, we predicted that positions better connected to harm and fairness arguments will be more popular among liberals and will become more popular over time among liberals and conservatives. Finally, the speed of this trend will be faster the better the position connects to harm and fairness arguments. These predictions all held with high accuracy in 44 years of polling on moral opinions. The model explains the connection between ideology and moral opinions, and generates precise predictions for future opinion change.

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