In his monumental study The mechanization of the world picture (Dijksterhuis, 1961), Eduard Dijksterhuis has documented how, in the 16th and 17th century, a mechanistic worldview emerged in modern science through developments in astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry and natural philosophy. Dijksterhuis marks the start of this process with the publication of Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium in 1543 and sees its culmination point in the publication of Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Math matica in 1687. In the worldview of modern science physical reality is depicted as a deterministic mechanism operating according to causal laws. Many have taken the success of modern technology as evidence of the truth of the mechanistic worldview of modern science (see, for example, Gellner, 1992 and, for a critical discussion, Latour, 1987), on the assumption that it is the knowledge about the laws that govern the causal connections within the clockwork universe that makes prediction and control of physical reality possible. Some have even gone so far as to argue that the mechanistic worldview of modern science sets the standard for what is real and what is rational (on this way of thinking and the problems it has caused see Dewey, 1980; Biesta, 2009). Developments in such interrelated fields as complexity theory, dynamic systems theory and chaos theory have challenged both the accuracy and dominance of the mechanistic worldview. They have done this first of all by highlighting phenomena that cannot be captured as deterministic, linear processes, and secondly by developing vocabularies and ways of thinking that are able to make sense of such phenomena and talk about them in more productive ways.
In discussions about democratic education, there is a strong tendency to see the role of education as that of the preparation of children and young people for their future participation in democratic life. A major problem with this view is that it relies on the idea that the guarantee for democracy lies in the existence of a properly educated citizenry so that once all citizens have received their education, democracy will simply follow.Purpose/Objective/Research Question/Focus of Study: The question that is explored in this article is whether it is possible to think of the relationship between education and democracy differently than in terms of preparation. This is important not only to be able to acknowledge the political nature of democratic education but also to be able to acknowledge the political "foundation" of democratic politics itself.Research Design: The argumentation in the article is developed through a critical analysis and discussion of the work of Hannah Arendt, with a specific focus on her ideas about the relationship between education and politics and her views on the role of understanding in politics.Findings/Results: Arendt's writings on the relationship between education and politics seem to be informed by a "developmentalistic" perspective in which it is maintained that the child is not yet ready for political life, so education has to be separated from politics and seen as a preparation for future participation in political life. Arendt's writings on politics and the role of understanding in political life point in a different direction. They articulate what it means to exist politically-that is, to exist together in plurality-and highlight that political existence is neither based on, nor can be guaranteed by, moral qualities such as tolerance and respect.Conclusions/Recommendations: The main conclusion of the article is that democratic education should not be seen as the preparation of citizens for their future participation in political life. Rather, it should focus on creating opportunities for political existence inside and outside schools. Rather than thinking of democratic education as learning for political existence, it is argued that the focus of our educational endeavours should be on how we can learn from political existence.
In this paper I discuss three different ways in which we can refer to those we teach: as learner, as student or as speaker. My interest is not in any aspect of teaching but in the question whether there can be such a thing as emancipatory education. Working with ideas from Jacques Rancière I offer the suggestion that emancipatory education can be characterised as education which starts from the assumption that all students can speak. It starts from the assumption, in other words, that students neither lack a capacity for speech, nor that they are producing noise. The idea of the student as a speaker is not offered as an empirical fact but as a different starting point for emancipatory education, one that positions equality at the beginning of education, not at its end
One way to characterise pragmatism is to see it as a philosophy that placed communication at the heart of philosophical, educational and political thinking. Whereas the shift from consciousness to communication can be seen as a major innovation in modern philosophy, it is not without problems. This article highlights some of these problems and suggests a way 'forward' by staging a discussion between pragmatism and deconstruction. Although there are striking similarities between pragmatism and deconstruction, it is argued that pragmatism and deconstruction cannot sit as easily together as some authors assume. The reason for this is not that pragmatism and deconstruction are incompatible philosophies but rather that deconstruction occurs at the very heart of pragmatism. This implies that pragmatism can only retain its commitment to communication in philosophy, education and politics if it acknowledges and, in a sense, embraces the occurrence of deconstruction in communication. This suggests that the future of pragmatism as a philosophy for education o lies in its deconstruction, something which is expressed in the idea of a deconstructive rather than a deconstructed pragmatism.