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  • 1.
    Ahmadpanah, M. M.
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Balliu, M.
    KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Olsson, L. E.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, A.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Securing Node-RED Applications2021In: Protocols, Strands, and Logic: Essays Dedicated to Joshua Guttman on the Occasion of his 66.66th Birthday / [ed] Daniel Dougherty, José Meseguer, Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim, Paul Rowe, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH , 2021, p. 1-21Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Trigger-Action Platforms (TAPs) play a vital role in fulfilling the promise of the Internet of Things (IoT) by seamlessly connecting otherwise unconnected devices and services. While enabling novel and exciting applications across a variety of services, security and privacy issues must be taken into consideration because TAPs essentially act as persons-in-the-middle between trigger and action services. The issue is further aggravated since the triggers and actions on TAPs are mostly provided by third parties extending the trust beyond the platform providers. Node-RED, an open-source JavaScript-driven TAP, provides the opportunity for users to effortlessly employ and link nodes via a graphical user interface. Being built upon Node.js, third-party developers can extend the platform’s functionality through publishing nodes and their wirings, known as flows. This paper proposes an essential model for Node-RED, suitable to reason about nodes and flows, be they benign, vulnerable, or malicious. We expand on attacks discovered in recent work, ranging from exfiltrating data from unsuspecting users to taking over the entire platform by misusing sensitive APIs within nodes. We present a formalization of a runtime monitoring framework for a core language that soundly and transparently enforces fine-grained allowlist policies at module-, API-, value-, and context-level. We introduce the monitoring framework for Node-RED that isolates nodes while permitting them to communicate via well-defined API calls complying with the policy specified for each node. 

  • 2.
    Ahmadpanah, M. M.
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Balliu, M.
    KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Olsson, L. E.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, A.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    SandTrap: Securing javascript-driven trigger-action platforms2021In: Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Association , 2021, p. 2899-2916Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Trigger-Action Platforms (TAPs) seamlessly connect a wide variety of otherwise unconnected devices and services, ranging from IoT devices to cloud services and social networks. TAPs raise critical security and privacy concerns because a TAP is effectively a “person-in-the-middle” between trigger and action services. Third-party code, routinely deployed as “apps” on TAPs, further exacerbates these concerns. This paper focuses on JavaScript-driven TAPs. We show that the popular IFTTT and Zapier platforms and an open-source alternative Node-RED are susceptible to attacks ranging from exfiltrating data from unsuspecting users to taking over the entire platform. We report on the changes by the platforms in response to our findings and present an empirical study to assess the implications for Node-RED. Motivated by the need for a secure yet flexible way to integrate third-party JavaScript apps, we propose SandTrap, a novel JavaScript monitor that securely combines the Node.js vm module with fully structural proxy-based two-sided membranes to enforce fine-grained access control policies. To aid developers, SandTrap includes a policy generation mechanism. We instantiate SandTrap to IFTTT, Zapier, and Node-RED and illustrate on a set of benchmarks how SandTrap enforces a variety of policies while incurring a tolerable runtime overhead. 

  • 3.
    Ahmadpanah, M. M.
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, A.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    LazyTAP: On-Demand Data Minimization for Trigger-Action Applications2023In: Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, vol. 2023, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. , 2023, p. 3079-3097Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Trigger-Action Platforms (TAPs) empower applications (apps) for connecting otherwise unconnected devices and services. The current TAPs like IFTTT require trigger services to push excessive amounts of sensitive data to the TAP regardless of whether the data will be used in the app, at odds with the principle of data minimization. Furthermore, the rich features of modern TAPs, including IFTTT queries to support multiple trigger services and nondeterminism of apps, have been out of the reach of previous data minimization approaches like minTAP. This paper proposes LazyTAP, a new paradigm for fine-grained on-demand data minimization. LazyTAP breaks away from the traditional push-all approach of coarse-grained data over-approximation. Instead, LazyTAP pulls input data on-demand, once it is accessed by the app execution. Thanks to the fine granularity, LazyTAP enables tight minimization that naturally generalizes to support multiple trigger services via queries and is robust with respect to nondeterministic behavior of the apps. We achieve seamlessness for third-party app developers by leveraging laziness to defer computation and proxy objects to load necessary remote data behind the scenes as it becomes needed. We formally establish the correctness of LazyTAP and its minimization properties with respect to both IFTTT and minTAP. We implement and evaluate LazyTAP on app benchmarks showing that on average LazyTAP improves minimization by 95% over IFTTT and by 38% over minTAP, while incurring a tolerable performance overhead. 

  • 4.
    Ahmadpanah, M. M.
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, Andrei
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden .
    Poster: Data Minimization by Construction for Trigger-Action Applications2023In: CCS 2023 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc , 2023, p. 3522-3524Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Trigger-Action Platforms (TAPs) enable applications to integrate various devices and services otherwise unconnected. Recent features of TAPs introduce additional sources of data such as queries in IFTTT. The current TAPs, like IFTTT, demand that trigger and query services transmit excessive amounts of user data to the TAP. To limit the data to what is actually necessary for the execution to comply with the principle of data minimization, input services should send no more than the necessary data. LazyTAP proposes a new paradigm of data minimization by construction in TAPs, introducing a novel perspective for data collection from input services. While the existing push-all approach of TAPs entails coarse-grained data over-approximation, LazyTAP pulls input data on-demand at the level of attributes, once accessed by the app execution. Thanks to the fine granularity provided by LazyTAP, multiple trigger and query services can be naturally minimized while the behavior of app executions is preserved. In addition, a great benefit of LazyTAP is being seamless for third-party app developers. By leveraging laziness, LazyTAP defers computation and proxies objects to load necessary remote data behind the scenes. Our evaluation study on app benchmarks shows that on average LazyTAP improves minimization by 95% over IFTTT and by 38% over minTAP, with a tolerable performance overhead. This poster goes into further details about LazyTAP and elaborates on its prototype implementation. 

  • 5.
    Bello, Luciano
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Sabelefeld, Andrei
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Value Sensitivity and Observable Abstract Values for Information Flow Control2015In: 20th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning LPAR'15, 2015, p. 63-78Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much progress has recently been made on information flow control, enabling the enforcement of increasingly rich policies for increasingly expressive programming languages. This has resulted in tools for mainstream programming languages as JavaScript, Java, Caml, and Ada that enforce versatile security policies. However, a roadblock on the way to wider adoption of these tools has been their limited permissiveness (high number of false positives). Flow-, context-, and object-sensitive techniques have been suggested to improve the precision of static information flow control and dynamic monitors have been explored to leverage the knowledge about the current run for precision. This paper explores value sensitivity to boost the permissiveness of information flow control. We show that both dynamic and hybrid information flow mechanisms benefit from value sensitivity. Further, we introduce the concept of observable abstract values to generalize and leverage the power of value sensitivity to richer programming languages. We demonstrate the usefulness of the approach by comparing it to known disciplines for dealing with information flow in dynamic and hybrid settings.

  • 6.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems.
    App security with JSFlow2016In: Proceedings - International Conference on Mobile Software Engineering and Systems, MOBILESoft 2016, 2016, p. 289-290Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This abstract accompanies a demo of app security using JSFlow [7]. The interested reader is encouraged to try the JSFlow tool [8] and get a full account of the theory and practice behind JSFlow, as detailed in a journal article [9]. The web has transitioned from simple, static pages to full edged applications. When loading a web application, content and scripts may be downloaded from various sources: the 1st party (the application provider), 3rd parties (e.g., library or service providers), as well other users (indirectly, via user generated content). The situation, where either of these sources is untrustworthy or malicious, may lead to attacker controlled code being executed on users' machines. This is particularly problematic, since attacker controlled code allows for complete circumvention of traditional protection mechanisms, and puts the users in the situation, where they cannot trust applications with sensitive information without endangering the con dentiality of the information.

  • 7.
    Hedin, Daniel
    et al.
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Rännvägen 6B, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Bello, L.
    Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Rännvägen 6B, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, A.
    Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Rännvägen 6B, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Information-flow security for JavaScript and its APIs2016In: Journal of Computer Security, ISSN 0926-227X, E-ISSN 1875-8924, Vol. 24, no 2, p. 181-234Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    JavaScript drives the evolution of the web into a powerful application platform. Increasingly, web applications combine services from different providers. The script inclusion mechanism routinely turns barebone web pages into full-fledged services built up from third-party code. Script inclusion poses a challenge of ensuring that the integrated third-party code respects security and privacy. This paper presents a dynamic mechanism for securing script executions by tracking information flow in JavaScript and its APIs. On the formal side, the paper identifies language constructs that constitute a core of JavaScript: dynamic objects, higher-order functions, exceptions, and dynamic code evaluation. It develops a dynamic type system that guarantees information-flow security for this language. Based on this formal model, the paper presents JSFlow, a practical security-enhanced interpreter for fine-grained tracking of information flow in full JavaScript and its APIs. Our experiments with JSFlow deployed as a browser extension provide in-depth understanding of information manipulation by third-party scripts. We find that different sites intended to provide similar services effectuate rather different security policies for the user's sensitive information: some ensure it does not leave the browser, others share it with the originating server, while yet others freely propagate it to third parties.

  • 8.
    Hedin, Daniel
    et al.
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Bello, Luciano
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Sabelefeld, Andrei
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Value-sensitive Hybrid Information Flow Control for a JavaScript-like Language2015In: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, vol. 2015, 2015, p. 351-365Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Secure integration of third-party code is one of the prime challenges for securing today’s web. Recent empirical studies give evidence of pervasive reliance on and excessive trust in third-party JavaScript, with no adequate security mechanism to limit the trust or the extent of its abuse. Information flow control is a promising approach for controlling the behavior of third-party code and enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies. While much progress has been made on static and dynamic approaches to information flow control, only recently their combinations have received attention. Purely static analysis falls short of addressing dynamic language features such as dynamic objects and dynamic code evaluation, while purely dynamic analysis suffers from inability to predict side effects in non-performed executions. This paper develops a value-sensitive hybrid mechanism for tracking information flow in a JavaScriptlike language. The mechanism consists of a dynamic monitor empowered to invoke a static component on the fly. This enables us to achieve a sound yet permissive enforcement. We establish formal soundness results with respect to the security policy of noninterference. In addition, we demonstrate permissiveness by proving that we subsume the precision of purely static analysis and by presenting a collection of common programming patterns that indicate that our mechanism has potential to provide more permissiveness than dynamic mechanisms in practice.

  • 9.
    Hedin, Daniel
    et al.
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, Andrei
    Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden.
    Web Application Security Using JSFlow2016In: Proceedings - 17th International Symposium on Symbolic and Numeric Algorithms for Scientific Computing, SYNASC 2015, 2016, p. 16-19Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Web applications are often vulnerable to code injection attacks and to attacksthrough buggy or malicious libraries. Unfortunately, the current protectionmechanisms are frequently ad-hoc, as a response to attacks after the fact. Thishad lead to a plethora of specialized protection mechanisms that are oftenbrittle and insufficient to guarantee security. This extended abstract accompanies a tutorial on web application security usingJSFlow, an information-flow aware interpreter for full non-strict ECMA-262(v.5). In contrast to access control, which most current protection mechanismsapply, information-flow control focuses on what applications are allowed to dowith the information they access. This removes the inherent trust that accesscontrol places on entities that are granted access. Dispensing with this trustis key for the protection to withstand bypassing in the presence ofuntrustworthy 3rd party code and code injection attacks. Based on two practical attacks against an example web application Hrafn, wedemonstrate the power of JSFlow. The attacks model the scenario where thecurrent standards protection mechanism are bypassed or not applicable. By usinga simple and natural security policy, we show how both attacks are prevented byJSFlow. Although information-flow control has not been tailor made to preventthis kind of attacks, it offers a uniform line of defense against untrustworthyand malicious code and ensures confidentiality of sensitive data.

  • 10.
    Hedin, Daniel
    et al.
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Sjösten, Alexander
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Piessens, Frank
    imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium.
    Sabelfeld, Andrei
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    A principled approach to tracking information flow in the presence of libraries2017Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There has been encouraging progress on information flow control for programs in increasingly complex programming languages, tracking the propagation of information from input sources to output sinks. Yet, programs are typically deployed in an environment with rich APIs and powerful libraries, posing challenges for information flow control when the code for these APIs and libraries is either unavailable or written in a different language. This paper presents a principled approach to tracking information flow in the presence of libraries. With the goal to strike the balance between security and precision, we present a framework that explores the middle ground between the “shallow”, signature-based modeling of libraries and the “deep”, stateful approach, where library models need to be supplied manually. We formalize our approach for a core language, extend it with lists and higher-order functions, and establish soundness results with respect to the security condition of noninterference.

  • 11.
    Sjosten, Alexander
    et al.
    Chalmers Univ Technol, Gothenburg, Sweden.;TU Wien, Vienna, Austria..
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers Univ Technol, Gothenburg, Sweden..
    Sabelfeld, Andrei
    Chalmers Univ Technol, Gothenburg, Sweden..
    EssentialFP: Exposing the Essence of Browser Fingerprinting2021In: 2021 IEEE EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY WORKSHOPS (EUROS&PW 2021), IEEE , 2021, p. 32-48Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Web pages aggressively track users for a variety of purposes from targeted advertisements to enhanced authentication. As browsers move to restrict traditional cookie-based tracking, web pages increasingly move to tracking based on browser fingerprinting. Unfortunately, the state-of-the-art to detect fingerprinting in browsers is often error-prone, resorting to imprecise heuristics and crowd-sourced filter lists. This paper presents EssentialFP, a principled approach to detecting fingerprinting on the web. We argue that the pattern of (i) gathering information from a wide browser API surface (multiple browser-specific sources) and (ii) communicating the information to the network (network sink) captures the essence of fingerprinting. This pattern enables us to clearly distinguish fingerprinting from similar types of scripts like analytics and polyfills. We demonstrate that information flow tracking is an excellent fit for exposing this pattern. To implement EssentialFP we leverage, extend, and deploy JSFlow, a state-of-the-art information flow tracker for JavaScript, in a browser. We illustrate the effectiveness of EssentialFP to spot fingerprinting on the web by evaluating it on two categories of web pages: one where the web pages perform analytics, use polyfills, and show ads, and one where the web pages perform authentication, bot detection, and fingerprinting-enhanced Alexa top pages.

  • 12.
    Sjösten, A.
    et al.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Hedin, Daniel
    Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Sabelfeld, A.
    Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Information flow tracking for side-effectful libraries2018In: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., Springer Verlag , 2018, p. 141-160Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Dynamic information flow control is a promising technique for ensuring confidentiality and integrity of applications that manipulate sensitive information. While much progress has been made on increasingly powerful programming languages ranging from low-level machine languages to high-level languages for distributed systems, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to libraries and APIs. The state of the art is largely an all-or-nothing choice: either a shallow or deep library modeling approach. Seeking to break out of this restrictive choice, we formalize a general mechanism that tracks information flow for a language that includes higher-order functions, structured data types and references. A key feature of our approach is the model heap, a part of the memory, where security information is kept to enable the interaction between the labeled program and the unlabeled library. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation and report on experiments with a file system library. The system has been proved correct using Coq.

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