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The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common resource pool overcome the tragedy of the commons?
Maastricht University .
Stockholm School of Economics.
Stockholm University.
Mälardalen University, School of Education, Culture and Communication.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7164-0924
2013 (English)In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 91, p. 122-130Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 91, p. 122-130
National Category
Mathematics
Research subject
Mathematics/Applied Mathematics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-22785DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009ISI: 000321484200008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:mdh-22785DiVA, id: diva2:664220
Funder
Swedish Research CouncilAvailable from: 2013-11-14 Created: 2013-11-14 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved

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Eriksson, Kimmo

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