Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic deci-sions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer dependson the relationship between the political unit and the entity that is either affectedor subjected to its decisions. The relational conditions for inclusion as stipulatedby the all-affected (AAP) and all-subjected principles (ASP) determine the spatialextension of democratic inclusion. Thus, AI qualifies for democratic inclusion if andonly if AI is either affected or subjected to decisions by the political unit in relevantways. This paper argues that the conventional view is too simple; that it neglectsdemocratic reasons to recognize only agents and/or moral patients as participantsin decision-making. The claim defended is that AAP and ASP implicitly affirmrequirements for agency and patiency. In ASP, the entity included must be an agentunderstood either in terms of legal status, capacity to comply with the law or abil-ity to recognize legitimate authority. In AAP, the entity included must be a patient,understood either in terms of capacity for sentience or consciousness. Thus, the ideahere is to explore the potential democratic inclusion of artificial intelligences by anupdated account of the relevant conditions of agency and patiency that are implicitin democratic theory. Although conceivable that AI is or will be either affected orsubjected in relevant ways to decisions made by political units, it is far less clear thatAI will ever be agents or patients in the sense required for democratic inclusion.