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Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
Mälardalen University, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Educational Sciences and Mathematics. (MAM)ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7164-0924
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
2021 (English)In: Frontiers in Psychology, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 12, article id 648405Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Frontiers Media S.A. , 2021. Vol. 12, article id 648405
Keywords [en]
cultural universals, moral arguments, moral foundations, moral objectivism, political attitudes
National Category
Philosophy Mathematics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-53847DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.648405ISI: 000634261100001PubMedID: 33790844Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85103333027OAI: oai:DiVA.org:mdh-53847DiVA, id: diva2:1542838
Available from: 2021-04-08 Created: 2021-04-08 Last updated: 2022-02-10Bibliographically approved

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Eriksson, Kimmo

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