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Reuse in (re) certification of systems
Mälardalen University, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Embedded Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6952-1053
Tecnalia, Spain.
2018 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The reduction of time and cost for the creation of a safety case is an urgent challenge that industries must face in the context of safety-critical product lines. A safety case is a contextualized structured argument constituted of process and product-based sub-arguments to show that a system is acceptably safe and thus \assure society at large that deployment of a given system does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm". Safety assurance and assessment processes required by standards and jurisdictions use to span several years and consume a large number of resources. To reduce time and cost, reuse capabilities are being investigated. At the core of this e ort, there is the objective to provide a generic metamodel capturing concepts of safety compliance processes. This is opening many doors towards a common model-based certi cation framework that can simultaneously target diverse domains such as the automotive, railway, avionics, air tra c management, industrial automation, or space domains. Then, di erent recurrent scenarios of (re)certi cation are being studied with their own characteristics and challenges. For example, in the system upgrade scenario we aim to identify the parts of the safety assurance project that can be reused for the upgraded system. In the cross-standard reuse scenario, the same system certi ed against a standard needs to be certi ed with another standard or, in the case of jurisdictions, checking compliance with a country jurisdiction that di ers from the current one. In the cross-concern reuse scenario, a system certi ed against a given standard (e.g., security related) requires to be certi ed with a standard targeting a di erent concern (e.g., safety). The AMASS project (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and Certi cation of Cyber-Physical Systems) continues previous e orts to de ne the Common Assurance and Certi cation Metamodel (CACM) and a tool-based platform is being developed. Among its functionalities, advanced techniques are provided enabling reuse by combining process lines, product lines and safety case lines.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018.
Series
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743 ; 10826
National Category
Computer Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-40847ISBN: 978-3-319-90420-7 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:mdh-40847DiVA, id: diva2:1249056
Conference
17th International Conference, ICSR 2018, Madrid, Spain, May 21-23, 2018
Projects
AMASS - Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical SystemsAvailable from: 2018-09-18 Created: 2018-09-18 Last updated: 2018-09-18Bibliographically approved

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Gallina, Barbara

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  • apa
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