One notion in agency theory is to equal boards of directors as principals. This theoretical assumption matches ideas and characteristics of how corporate boards are formed in the West. While “the directors as principals’ idea” enables an understanding of a formal governance structure it fails to adequately explain financial performance as well as other performance indicators (van Essen et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015). Other studies signal absence of empirics supporting a link between corporate board structure and firm performance (Shukeri et al., 2012). In combination with recent bankruptcies in multinational companies, like Enron and Lehman Brothers, it thus seems logical for scholars to begin question the efficiency of Western corporate governance models. Our results, based on macro-level data from 38 countries during the time 2006 to 2014, indicate a lack of support for efficiency of the Western governance model in Asia at the same time as there exists differences within Western and Asian countries.