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Delay Attack versus Clock Synchronization –
A Time Chase

Elena Lisova, Elisabeth Uhlemann, Johan Åkerberg, Mats Björkman
Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden
{elena.lisova, elisabeth.uhlemann, johan.akerberg, mats.bjorkman}@mdh.se

Abstract— Clock synchronization is one of the most essential assets for distributed real-time systems, as sensing, control and actuation require synchronized communication to meet real-time deadlines. We propose a distributed monitoring method to detect if an adversary is interfering with the clock synchronization protocol. The monitor uses certain network indicators and a set of rules to decide about switching between Normal, Quarantine or Attack Detected states. Further, we propose a way to define thresholds for decision-making based on theoretical analysis of the indicator values influenced by an attack. In addition, we formulate the problem of adversary influence detection in the network as a detection theory problem and use it to derive an additional indicator for the network monitor. Finally, we analyze the time chase between the monitor and an adversary to investigate which factors influence the final outcome.

I. INTRODUCTION

The dependability of distributed control applications with real-time requirements is strongly tied to precise and correct clocks [1]. Therefore, robust clock-synchronization for safety-critical application with real-time requirements is a paramount need to address [2]. There are several widely used standards for clock synchronization in industrial networks. Here, we consider IEEE 1588 [3], as it is common in distributed real-time systems [1]. The protocol has a master-slave approach, i.e., the master has an excellent clock and the other nodes adjust their clocks to this. Robust clock synchronization should consider both security threats and operational faults, i.e., if clock synchronization can be broken as a result of a security breach or if it is not safe enough. A possible way to break clock synchronization with IEEE 1588, is by an asynchronous delay attack [4]. The prerequisite of such an attack is prior network penetration by an adversary. One of the ways to penetrate the network is by using weaknesses of the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), i.e., by conducting an ARP poisoning attack [5]. Annex K of the 1588 standard has some security guidelines, e.g., targeting message integrity and group authentication. However, its evaluation has shown that the security service needs improvement [6], as it cannot cope with some types of attacks [7].

The effect of delay attacks on clock synchronization can be mitigated by using a multipath strategy [8]. However, this solution requires changes to the standards. We have proposed to use distributed monitoring as a tool to detect that the network is under attack, and to prevent propagation of adversary influence by deploying relevant mitigation techniques [9]. This paper is a continuation of our work [9], where a game theory framework was proposed to investigate the interaction between a monitor and an adversary. The main focus of this paper is the delicate balance between the time needed for a monitor to detect an attack and the time needed for an adversary to reach its target; to keep the network unsynchronized sufficiently long to damage the application. Furthermore, we formulate the attack disclosure procedure detection as a detection theory problem. This allows us to introduce an additional indicator that can be used by the monitor to confirm if an adversary is present in the network. We investigate how a monitor can set thresholds for making a decision about suspicion of adversary presence in the network by continuous monitoring of indicators, i.e., characteristics revealing a new trend in the calculated clock offsets. Based on the ways those thresholds are set, the time chase between an adversary and the monitor can be evaluated. Although we consider clock synchronization being affected by a security breach, the approach is based on run-time monitoring of calculated offset and, therefore, can also be used to detect existence of potential safety problems in the network, e.g., malfunctioning of time-stamping in a switch. It allows the use of monitoring as a part in a safety case of networks following any kind of schedule [10]. A safety case is a collection of arguments demonstrating that the required level of safety is achieved and it should also cover security-related aspects [11].

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the necessary background whereas Section III presents an analysis of the considered indicators. The additional indicator derived by applying detection theory and its analysis is also presented. Section IV presents a discussion about the time chase between an adversary and the monitor. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND

To be able to coordinate schedules, the nodes need to share the same notion of time. Therefore, their clocks should be periodically corrected by a clock synchronization algorithm as it is presented in Fig. 1, where the solid green teeth represents the time difference between a node’s clock and its grand master (GM) clock. The difference between GM time and the local node time at the end of each resynchronization interval (RI) is called offset. If the clock stays within the allowed boundaries marked as dashed green lines in Fig. 1, the offset is less than offset\_max and the node is in a synchronized state, otherwise it is in an unsynchronized state. The offset is typically calculated via the exchange of time-stamped synchronization messages.

In IEEE 1588, a slave and a GM are exchanging synchronization messages as follows. First, the GM sends out a time stamped sync message. When the slave receives the message,
it also timestamps it to access the arrival time and sends out a delay_req message containing the two previous timestamps plus a new one to indicate the transmission time. Finally, when the GM receives that message, it timestamps it to determine its arrival and sends out a delay_resp message. At the end of such an exchange, both the GM and the slave have time stamps of the sync and delay_req messages at the moments of transmitting and receiving. Knowing these four values and assuming the absence of asymmetrical delay, the offset between the two clocks can be calculated.

If an adversary can selectively delay a message in one direction, e.g., the sync message, the locally calculated offset will have an error that equals half of the imposed delay [12]. This kind of attack is powerful, as it does not require changing the message or producing a new one. In Fig. 1, a delay attack is initiated at $t_{\text{delay}}$, where two types of delays are presented: the solid teeth indicates a linearly increasing delay (LID), whereas the dotted teeth a constant delay (CD) [9]. In each RI there is an uncompensated error in the calculated offset that eventually brings the node into unsynchronized state. With a LID, it takes $t_{\text{break}}$ to gradually increase the imposed delay enough to breach clock synchronization. The adversary target is to keep the node unsynchronized for at least $t_{\text{fail}}$, as the number of erroneous messages then becomes sufficient to make the application fail.

Distributed network monitoring is used to detect adversary presence in the network and to detect if a node is unsynchronized. A monitor is located in each node and it collects statistic about offset measured according to e.g., IEEE 1588. As shown in Fig. 2, there are three possible states for the network, namely, normal (NS), quarantine (QS) and attack detected state (ADS) [9]. In NS, the monitor believes that there is no active adversary in the network and clock synchronization has not been broken. In ADS, the monitor is assured that there is an adversary in the network affecting clock synchronization. Finally, in QS there are indicators of anomaly activity in the network, but the monitor is not assured and needs additional arguments in favor of an attack being performed. There are rules for switching between the described states. These are based on evaluation of relevant indicators, i.e., characteristics calculated by the monitor based on observed samples of calculated offset values. There are two types of indicators: one group we call main indicators, which are monitored constantly; and a second group termed additional indicators used only in QS.

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{I}_s &= \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{real},i} + \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{delay},i}, \\
\mathcal{I}_a &= \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}.
\end{align*}

Although these two indicators are not independent characteristics of the offset distribution, they are natural initial choice in attempting to detect a new trend in the distribution, as they can be calculated easily and reflect the main changes.

As attack discovery is connected to the monitor checking the indicators values, we need to analyze how fast these are changing with response to the delay attack. To analyze how the indicators behave with time during the attack, we divide the measured offset, $\text{offset}$, into two components: one caused by natural factors (e.g., natural clock drift and channel delay caused by, e.g., environmental conditions), $\text{offset}_{\text{real}}$, and one caused by the attack, $\text{offset}_{\text{attack}}$. The offset measured in a node at the $i$-th RI is presented as a sum:

$$\text{offset}_i = \text{offset}_{\text{real},i} + \text{offset}_{\text{delay},i}.$$  

In the similar manner we split the indicators. Let $j$ be a RI when the attack was deployed, i.e., offset values calculated starting from the $j+1$ RI and further have an error caused by the adversary. The mean then can be presented as:

$$\overline{\mathcal{I}}_s = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{real},i} + \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{delay},i},$$

where the first term represents the indicator value caused by nature and the second one by the attack. In other words:

$$\overline{\mathcal{I}}_{\text{real},k} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{real},i},$$

$$\overline{\mathcal{I}}_{\text{attack},k} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}.$$

Having equation (4), we can plot the dependency of the indicator value for the considered types of delay attack. To do this a statistic window, $W$, should be set, i.e., the amount of samples or offsets that are used for the calculations. With each RI the window moves by one element and allows partly discarding the previous history of the indicator, which can be useful, e.g.,
for industrial sensor networks with limited resources. The results presented in Fig. 3 are obtained for the following values:

\[ j = 1200 \]
\[ W = 100 \]
\[ 1/\lambda = 80 \mu s \]
\[ \text{mean}_{\text{real}} = 80 \mu s \]

where \( \lambda \) is the parameter of the exponential distribution for natural delay. Note that the offset is multiplied by two in the calculations, as the offset imposed by the adversary is a half of the imposed delay. Fig. 3 shows that the mean is affected by adversary influence, but, the values increase only slowly, i.e., it takes several RIs before the attack is visible. In bigger perspective, the influence of the adversary is clearly visible, but it can be challenging to detect adversary presence before clock synchronization is broken for a sufficiently many RIs.

The second indicator can be analyzed in the similar manner. By using equations (3-6) we have:

\[
(k-1) \cdot \sigma_i^2 = \frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{i=1}^{k} (\sigma_{\text{real},i} - \text{offset}_{\text{real},i})^2 + \\
\frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} - \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}}{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} + \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}} \right)^2 + 2\sigma_{\text{real},i} \cdot \text{offset}_{\text{real},i}.
\]

(8)

Let us introduce the following notation for the component of standard deviation caused by the nature:

\[
\sigma_{\text{real},i}^2 = \frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{i=1}^{k} (\sigma_{\text{real},i} - \text{offset}_{\text{real},i})^2.
\]

(9)

Then (8) can be presented as:

\[
(k-1) \cdot \sigma_i^2 = (k-1) \sigma_{\text{real},i}^2 + \\
\frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} - \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}}{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} + \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}} \right)^2 + 2\sigma_{\text{real},i} \cdot \text{offset}_{\text{real},i}.
\]

(10)

In (10) the second component caused by the attack, therefore the following notation can be introduced:

\[
\sigma_{\text{attack},i}^2 = \frac{1}{k-1} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} - \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}}{\sigma_{\text{attack},i} + \text{offset}_{\text{attack},i}} \right)^2 + 2\sigma_{\text{real},i} \cdot \text{offset}_{\text{real},i}.
\]

(11)

By calculating \( \sigma_{\text{attack}} \) for different types of delays, the indicator value can be compared. The results are presented in Fig. 4. We can see that compared to the attack component of the mean, the attack component of the standard deviation is more recognizable from the very beginning of the attack. This demonstrates that standard deviation can have a lower threshold set for making the decision of being under attack.

A relevant parameter that characterizes only the monitor, not the adversary, is the window size, \( W \). It is a sliding window, i.e., each RI the window is moved by one position. The choice of having a sliding window was based on the possibility of restricted rescources for the node. It is interesting to see how the standard deviation depends on the size of the window. Note that this is not the case for the mean, as its attack component does not depend on the real components of the offset. Fig. 5 shows the dependency of the attack part of the standard deviation from a window size for a fixed number of RIs and different types of attack. We can see that after some time the value does not change much, however there are rapid changes in the beginning. This “shaking” is more visible when the amount of samples without and with attack component are close to each other. This suggests that checking values of the standard deviation using different window sizes and comparing them can be used as an additional indicator. Further, we can conclude that it makes sense to start checking it only after we have a suspicion that something is wrong, i.e., in QS.

Next, we investigate how detection theory and more precisely the Neyman-Pearson approach can be used as an indicator. Detection theory allows making an optimal choice in the sense of minimizing the probability of error of Type II (i.e., false negative probability), by selecting one out of two possible hypotheses based on test samples with fixed probability of
wrongly rejected main hypothesis, i.e., Type I error (i.e., false positive probability) [13]. To test the hypotheses, the Neyman-Pearson detection lemma can be used [14], defining a threshold for making a decision about which hypothesis is correct based on a set of collected samples:
\[ \Lambda(\text{offset}) = \frac{L(\text{offset}|H_0)}{L(\text{offset}|H_1)} \leq \text{threshold}, \] (12)
where \( H_0 \) is the main hypothesis, and \( H_1 \) is an alternative hypothesis, \( L \) is a likelihood function. Hypothesis \( H_0 \) claims that there is no malicious delay caused by the adversary and hypothesis \( H_1 \) claims that there is a malicious delay:
\[ H_0: \text{offset}_{\text{attack}} = 0 \]
\[ H_1: \text{offset}_{\text{attack}} \neq 0 \]
In this case as it was demonstrated in (12), we can calculate the threshold for decision making as a ratio of the corresponding likelihood functions.

The overall conclusion from the conducted analysis is that once the attack is deployed the statistical characteristics of the measured offset change. It means that the considered indicators can be used for making a decision and switching states of the network. Standard deviation is more sensitive to the attack already from the beginning and therefore, it can be used as a main indicator. Mean in its turn requires some RIs to clearly indicate the attack, and thus it can be used as an additional indicator in QS along with a check based on window size and Neyman-Pearson detection.

IV. THRESHOLDING INDICATORS

For each main indicator we set two thresholds: low and high. We call an indicator \textbf{positive}, when its value is bigger than the corresponding lower threshold, otherwise \textbf{negative}. The rules and their correlation to switching between states, as demonstrated in the Fig. 1, are the following:
\textbf{Rule 1}. If \( K_{\text{QS}} \) of the main indicators are above the corresponding low threshold, the system is switched into the QS.
\textbf{Rule 2}. If more than \( K_{\text{QS}} \) of the indicators are above the low thresholds, the system is switched into the ADS.
\textbf{Rule 3}. If \( K_{\text{ADS}} \) of the indicators are above the corresponding high threshold, the system is switched into the ADS.
\textbf{Rule 4}. If any of the cases described below is true, the system is switched from QS mode to ADS:

1. If there are positive indicators of network anomaly according to the additional indicators deployed in QS;
2. If Rule 2 or Rule 3 can be applied.

Having the results from Section III we can evaluate how the indicators react for the considered types of attacks. A threshold example based on standard deviation and LID is presented in Fig. 6. The other types of delays can be considered in a similar manner. In the case of LID attack, the chosen thresholds allow switching into QS after 7 RIs from the moment of an attack being deployed and into ADS after 16 RIs.

A threshold can be derived for the LID attack by considering the Neyman-Pearson lemma under the assumption that two scenarios are possible, namely: \( H_1 \) — there is LID attack or \( H_0 \) — there is no attack, NA. Previously, we showed how the PDF of the offset measured in a node can be calculated for the considered types of delay attacks [9]. The detection coefficient was introduced to indicate the difference visible in the PDF when the network is under the attack and to show the level of adversary exposure. For the LID the detection coefficient can be calculated as:
\[ k_{\text{LID}} = \sum_{i=m}^{N_{\text{RIs}}} \lambda e^{-\lambda \text{offset} i}, \] (14)
where \( i \) is a number of RIs; \( P_{\text{LID}} \) is the probability of the adversary choosing \( d_{\text{LID}} \) for the respective sets of delay values for these attacks. The PDF of the asynchronous delay during the attack is an exponential distribution scaled with the detection coefficient value, i.e.:
\[ f_{\text{offset}}(\text{offset}) = k_{\text{LID}} \lambda e^{-\lambda \text{offset}}. \] (15)
The likelihood function for an exponential distribution can be presented as a multiplication of the related PDF for each sample from the window. Therefore based on (14) we can derive the following likelihood for the described hypothesis:
\[ L(H_{1,\text{LID}}) = k_{\text{LID}} \lambda^W e^{-\lambda \sum_{i=m}^{N_{\text{RIs}}} \text{offset} i}. \] (16)
For the hypothesis \( H_0 \) the likelihood function is the same as for different variants of hypothesis \( H_1 \), but without the detection coefficient. Now, we can calculate the thresholds according to (1) for the considered scenarios:

\[ \text{https://www.statlect.com/fundamentals-of-statistics/exponential-distribution-maximum-likelihood} \]
To calculate values of the detection coefficient for different types of attacks, we need to define a set of possible steps for LID. Instead of using absolute values, we express the delays for different types of attacks through the variable $x$, which exact value can be chosen depending on the application. This way the results are comparable and more independent of the actual values of the delays. For example, if $\text{offset}_{\text{max}} = 50\mu\text{s}$ and an adversary wants to break clock synchronization after maximum 10 RIs from the point in time when the attack was first deployed, $x$ equals $10\mu\text{s}$. The delay set should be complimented with a corresponding set of probabilities of occurrence, which we assign randomly in Tab. 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LID</th>
<th>$d_{\text{LID}}$, $\mu\text{s}$</th>
<th>$p_{\text{LID}}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.1$x$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5$x$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1$x$</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3$x$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then, for the window size $W$ the following values of detection coefficient for different strategies can be calculated: $k_{\text{LID}, i} = 5X, 65X, 1 \, 227X, 24 \, 443X, 490 \, 430X, \ldots$. The values are calculated for different numbers of RIs.

The results above show that the considered attacks can be detected using the Neyman-Pearson approach. However, the conclusion is only valid for the values considered. A sensitivity analysis of the threshold and its parameters should be conducted to generalize the outcome. This is one a direction for future work. The results were obtained for the window size 10, i.e., under the assumption that ten observed samples are satisfying hypothesis $H_1$. However, this is not the case when the attack was just deployed. Therefore, the likelihood-ratio test can be used as an indicator for switching between QS and ADS, i.e. as an additional indicator. In this way, at the moment when the additional indicator is used the attack is already ongoing during some RIs and the technique can thus be used more efficiently.

The conducted analysis allows to set thresholds depending on application requirements, i.e., how many RIs a node can be in unsynchronized state. This number depends on how active the considered node is. For example, if it sends out status data once per 20 RIs, it can tolerate (i.e., does not propagate the adversary influence further itself) being in unsynchronized state for up 10 intervals on average. Setting these thresholds is a tradeoff between estimation of possible harm from the node being in unsynchronized state and cost of bringing the network into a safe state (as a result of switching into ADS) in case of a false alarm.

V. TIME CHASE

In this section we consider the interaction between an adversary and the monitor from a time chase point of view, i.e., what happens first: the monitor detects the adversary influence on clock synchronization or the adversary accomplishes its target of putting a node into unsynchronized state for at least a specified amount of RIs? We assume that the adversary goal is breaking clock synchronization and keep it so for at least $t_{\text{tar}}$.

The relation between the speed of a delay attack and the speed of an attack discovery influence the attack propagation in the network and thus defines the attack efficiency. The attack influence on the network depends on how the error propagates through the topology and the particular use case. In this analysis we consider the time the adversary needs to put the node into unsynchronized mode and leave the further propagation of its influence outside of the scope.

Each RI, the clock is corrected according to a calculated offset, so that the clock time stays within the allowed boundaries. The monitor needs $t_{\text{QS-ADS}}$ after the attack was deployed to switch the network into QS and $t_{\text{qs-ADS}}$ after it was switched to QS to switch the network into ADS. The alternative scenario is when the monitor switches the network from NS directly into ADS, $t_{\text{NS-ADS}}$. The question is who is faster – adversary achieving its goal or monitor switching into ADS:

$$\min\{t_{\text{NS-ADS}}, t_{\text{NS-QS}}+t_{\text{QS-ADS}}\} \geq (t_{\text{breach}}+t_{\text{daw}}).$$

Even though the precise formulation of the problem can vary for different types of delay attack, the main question is the same, whether the adversary can succeed or the monitor can prevent it. In the LID case, the adversary needs some RIs to bring the clock into unsynchronized state. However, the LID mode may be appealing for an adversary as it implies that a trend in the indicators behavior appears before clock synchronization is actually broken and, therefore it can be challenging to detect. However, for the considered example, we can see that this type of the attack does not bring benefits from an indicators behavior point of view. For CD mode, the synchronization is broken from the moment the attack is deployed, i.e., $t_{\text{breach}} = 0$. This is an advantage for adversary, as the monitor needs to react faster compare to the case when the attack requires a preparation phase.

One way to cope with a delay attack is to introduce Relaxed Mode [12], i.e., a mode when the clock is temporary allowed to exceed the boundaries. Such a mode brings degraded quality of synchronization, however it gives an advantage in the time chase when $t_{\text{breach}} \neq 0$. It can also be beneficial even if $t_{\text{breach}} = 0$, in case the adversary does not have knowledge about the boundaries in the Relaxed Mode. There are different proposals for IEEE 1588 extensions [15]. However, as considered way to break synchronization is based on introducing selected asymmetrical delay, many proposed fault-tolerance techniques, such as on-the-fly time-stamping or grouping masters to a master group to detect a failure of one of them, cannot cope with this type of attack. The attack is challenging to counter react, as it does not require message modification. One of the feasible ways to detect such an attack can be a multipath strategy, however in such case an adversary just needs to take over several communication channels instead of one to succeed.

The more critical the application is the more desirable it is to make $t_{\text{QS}}$ smaller (besides the overall goal to decrease $t_{\text{QS}}+t_{\text{daw}}$) as the cost of a false positive can be tolerated. The earlier the network is switched into QS, the earlier additional monitoring techniques can be deployed, and the earlier we can start to decrease the level of trust for the current GM. However, it also implies bigger false positive probability. To find the balance risk assessment should be conducted to evaluate possible harm and cost of preventing techniques [16].

One more factor to consider when shaping the monitor strategy comes from risk assessment. In the security area risk assessment can be built upon Attack Three Analysis (ATA), a
technique that helps to identify ways of an adversary to achieve its target and calculate the probability along with the cost of an attack [17]. We can characterize the monitor strategy by considering the risks that exist in the system. Risks imposed by a decision can be calculated as a multiplication of severity of consequences, i.e., potential loss, with a likelihood of event occurrence:

\[
\text{risk} = \text{severity of consequences} \times \text{probability}. \quad (19)
\]

For example, let us consider switching modes NS → QS from the monitor perspective. There is a risk to make a switch when there is no actual attack. The consequences are cost of taking additional precautions, e.g., checking additional indicators, tolerating reduced quality of clock synchronization introduced by the Relaxed Mode, and cost of eventual switching of the system into ADS. The related probability is called false positive probability. There is also a risk to fail to detect a trend in the offset values. The consequences are the cost of the adversary achieving its target, i.e., disrupting the network, and the probability is termed false negative. The combination of these factors shapes the strategy of the monitor, i.e., how reactive it should be.

To reason about acceptable risks, the As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle can be used [18]. The approach defines different risk zones that are connected to the probability of occurrence of related hazardous events. One such zone is an ALARP zone, in which the risk should be reduced to as low as “reasonable practicable”. The challenge is to define this level for a concrete system. The basis of such reasoning is a particular application, i.e., a use case. If it is a safety-critical system, it is much more reasonable to invest more in its protection to reduce possible risks.

The time chase between an adversary and the monitor is defined by the adversary strategy to achieve its target and by the monitor strategy to counter-react. The only factor we can influence directly is the monitor strategy, and we can only reason and make assumptions about the adversary strategy based on possible gains and cost investments. Here (18-19) serves as useful grounds for deciding how proactive the monitor should be.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

In this paper, we proposed a distributed monitoring method to detect if an adversary is interfering with the clock synchronization protocol. The monitor uses certain indicators and a set of rules to decide about switching between normal, quarantine and attack detected states. We proposed a way to set thresholds for switching between these states based on application requirements and time analysis of indicator performance. We also formulated an attack exposure problem using detection theory and formulated an additional indicator that can be used in quarantine state. To analyze the results, we considered a time chase between an adversary and the monitor. The results show that the mean values of the offset, as an indicator, reflects the trend change only in the long run and, therefore, can be used for applications that can tolerate a broken synchronization for several resynchronization intervals. Standard deviation in turn, detects changes in the trend faster, i.e., in fewer resynchronization intervals and, therefore, can be used as an indicator for more critical applications. For the considered system model, an additional indicator was proposed, derived from detection theory, which is able to identify the considered types of attacks. However, a more complex hypothesis, that combines different types of attacks and detects influence on the offset more generally, needs to be considered to be able to generalize the outcome.

Future work includes several directions, such as generalization of the game theoretical framework, so that it can be applicable to protect other system assets; as well as further development of main and additional indicators. We plan to model several use cases to see how using a monitor affects the network dependability. We are also looking into an analysis of the monitor overhead to identify the cost of its implementation.

REFERENCES